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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the cause of the nearly twenty-five year decline in the percentage of U.S. born
undergraduates earning degrees in engineering. This dramatic decline has occurred despite incredibly
high pay and low unemployment among individuals holding engineering degrees. On the surface, this
situation appears to be violating the basic laws of labor-market supply and demand. A system dynamics
model was created to represent the institutional forces and feedback loops present in the real-world
system. This model internally represents the economic forces governing the choice to pursue science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education, distinguishing features of highly
quantitative knowledge that constrain its transmission, and factors determining the overall quality of
STEM education in our schools.
This work presents a theory that high industry pay for STEM workers and low pay for STEM K-12
teachers directly cause long-term labor shortages that are self perpetuating. A scarcity of STEM workers
will cause wages to rise as employers bid up the price of those skills in the short-term. Schools are left
with fewer qualified and lower quality teachers. This makes labor shortages worse ten to twenty years
down the road. The fact that mathematics knowledge is highly sequential with strong dependencies on
past-performance exacerbates the situation. Students who fall behind in mathematics find it nearly
impossible to catch up. This work explores many societal shifts that occurred in the 1950's through
1980's that could have resulted in the perplexing behavior seen from 1985 until the present day. Finally,
policy proposals to correct the situation are simulated in the model to test their ability to move the system
in a more positive direction. The system is found to exhibit "tipping point" behavior. Small reforms will
have negligible impact while larger reforms have the potential to make the system move into a
fundamentally better pattern of behavior, but only after considerable delays.
In addition, this work presents a speculative hypothesis for the cause of Kondratieff economic long-waves
briefly in an appendix based on unanticipated behaviors present in portions of the model.
Thesis Supervisor: J. Bradley Morrison
Title: Senior Lecturer of the Engineering Systems Division
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1 Introduction
1.1 Thesis Statement and Primary Research Objectives
The percentage of students earning Bachelor's degrees in engineering is almost half what it was in 1985.
This decline has occurred despite the fact that wages for engineering graduates are higher than those of
any other degree-type. Unemployment for scientists and engineers has just hit a record low. What is
being studied in this thesis is an apparent contradiction: people decreasingly willing to go into a field in
which wages are extremely strong. On its surface, this situation appears to fly in the face of the law of
supply & demand.
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Throughout this thesis I will develop a model-based theory that explores this paradox. The theory
proposes that extremely strong wages for science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM)
workers combined with low science and mathematics teacher wages in K-12 education directly cause
long-term labor shortages in technically oriented fields that get worse over time because of positive
feedback loops in the system. The architectural relationships between the U.S. systems of government,
K-12 education, academia, and industry are set up to systematically under-develop the quantitative and
analytical skills that the economy desires most. Multiple societal shifts in the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's
(many of them positive) triggered unintended behaviors present in the system today.
I will then show that some policy reforms are capable of improving the situation, while others may be
entirely useless. Most effective reforms will require sustained investment over long periods of time
before their benefits are fully realized. Even after implementing effective reforms, the situation may
actually appear to get worse in the short term because of the immense momentum built into the system.
Furthermore, incremental or piecemeal fixes may have no impact because the system exhibits "tipping
point" behavior. Under the current configuration it is stuck in a poor operating region. There exist other
more beneficial operating regions that could be moved into if reform is powerful enough to "tip" the
system into those other regions of behavior.
The research method uses the model in three ways:
* Reproduce history: Iteratively construct system dynamics models that can endogenously
reproduce the simultaneous long term strength of engineering wages and long term decline in
U.S. born engineering graduates. Justify all structural relationships in the model with relevant
supporting literature so that the results of the model are believable.
* Project history into the future: Once models are capable of plausibly reproducing history, use
them to understand what the future might hold for the strength of the U.S. technical workforce if
current policy is maintained.
* Test alternative futures: Test various policy proposals aimed at increasing the number of U.S.
born engineering graduates to see if they are capable of increasing future graduation rates
significantly above those produced in the forward-looking historical run. Attempt to determine if
they will be effective if applied in the real world.
1.2 Problem Importance
The subjects explored here have profound implications for the continued prosperity of the United States.
It is generally acknowledged that technological advance is the main driver of America's GDP. The
health of U.S. based high-tech firms should be important to anyone worried about employment levels in
the broader economy. According to the recent report jointly published by the National Academy of
Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of Medicine titled Rising Above the Gathering
Storm (NAE, 2007 p. 29), "scientists and engineers tend, through innovation, to create new jobs not only
for themselves but also for workers throughout the economy." Unlike professionals in other high-paying
careers such as finance or law, engineers and scientists not only create value for themselves and their
firms, they also tend to generate growth for others as a result of their economic activity. This is because
the primary focus and daily activity of an engineer is the creation, rather than the capture, of economic
value. Promoting a technical economic base is therefore fundamental to securing our presently-high
standard of living.
Shortages in the supply of technically-capable people in the labor pool could force U.S. firms to outsource
jobs for two reasons. Most obviously, if not enough employees exist to meet business demands, then
outsourcing must take place. Secondly, shortages in the labor force will drive up the price of high-tech
skills beyond their already high price. As globalization reduces the costs associated with managing global
operations, the widening gap between what firms must expend to employ local vs. foreign labor will
increase the frequency of outsourcing. Under one nightmare scenario, these two effects could merge to
form a picture similar to Clayton Christensen's concept of "disruption." (Christensen, 1997) Under such a
scenario, American wages could remain strong at the same time that many highly skilled jobs move to
developing countries. The most stable remaining jobs would be those that are "sticky" or hard to move
abroad. Many of these jobs are in the defense sector. Such jobs are less likely to produce exportable
products that help improve the balance of trade. In addition, sticky jobs may be relatively less likely to
lead to the types of innovation that drive economic growth or create new jobs. Ultimately under this
scenario, the American high-tech industry could be transformed from a global powerhouse into a cottage-
industry, taking the U.S. economy with it.
Maintaining a healthy number of individuals in the STEM educational pipeline that produces technically
oriented workers is important to the future health of the country. Keeping American technical workers
satisfied with their jobs is important, but rapid wage growth in the short term could lead to elimination of
those jobs in the medium to long term as America is disrupted.
1.3 Thesis Organization
This work will be organized into three main parts. In the first part a conceptual model will be
incrementally presented and supported by multi-disciplinary literature and data. This model will be built
with the goal of accurately representing the structure of the system and some of the main causal drivers
that influence the number of U.S. born engineering graduates. The main components of the notional
model presented will be:
* Supply and demand feedback loops showing how the career opportunities available to STEM
workers affect the decision of currently enrolled students to maintain interest in STEM education
and ultimately pursue a STEM career themselves.
* A STEM education pipeline representing the number of students who continue to incrementally
build mathematics competence at different stages of education.
* A teacher quality loop that shows how the career opportunities available to STEM teachers
influence the quantity and quality of the teachers that educate students in the pipeline.
Simulations will then be presented to highlight the behaviors of this system. Graphs will be shown that
demonstrate a qualitative similarity between what has actually happened, and the behavior produced by
the model. The simulation graphs will also project thirty years into the future (until 2040) to indicate
where the system is likely to move if current policies are maintained.
Finally, simulation results will show the effectiveness of a variety of policy fixes. The historical model
will be used as a starting point. Historical behavior will continue until 2008 when changes will be
introduced. Differences shown between the "historical" run and the "policy" run between the years 2008
and 2040 will highlight either the usefulness or inefficacy of different proposals under consideration by
policy makers today.
Throughout this work, conceptual models will be presented that convey the meaning of the full simulating
version of the model. Equation listings and block diagrams for the full version of the model are presented
in appendices.
1.4 Project Context
This project began as a collaborative effort with the Boeing Corporation. This relationship was initiated
by Dr. Brad Morrison at Brandeis University. Boeing (and other companies) engaged students in Dr.
Morrison's 'Applications of System Dynamics' course as external consultants to apply system dynamics
modeling expertise to aid in the understanding of their business problems. Boeing wanted to use system
dynamics modeling to bring a fresh perspective to some of the problems articulated in two well respected
reports published by collaborative groups spanning academia, industry, and government:
Rising Above the Gathering Storm:
Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter Economic Future
Committee on Prospering in the Global Economy of the 21 st Century
An Agenda for American Science and Technology
National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine
2007
(NAE, 2007)
A Test of Leadership
Charting the Future of U.S. Higher Education
A Report of the Commission Appointed by
Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings
September 2006
(U.S. Department of Education, 2006)
Both reports are publicly available and can be found online. These reports discuss the importance of
STEM to our economy and threats to American competitiveness. They compile a great deal of publicly
available data and offer opinions on policy solutions intended to address such problems. Although my
opinions and findings of this thesis do not always agree with interpretations of data and policy
recommendations found in these reports, both are good places to start when trying to understand the
challenges America faces and the current state of thinking about the causes and solutions to those
problems.
Paul Newton (Boeing Phantom Works) provided modeling guidance and both Paul and Michael Richey
(Boeing Learning Training & Development) provided context for the effort by serving as a 'clients' to
ensure that modeling focus continued to meet Boeing's needs. Paul and Mike gave support, but offered
little direct guidance, preferring to see what emerged.
Boeing's stated concern revolved around the future of their technical workforce. A large portion of
Boeing's engineers will be eligible to retire in the next ten years. Boeing fears that the U.S. is not
producing enough engineers to replace these domestic retirements and meet future growth demands.
They therefore wanted modeling to focus on the causal relationships that affect the number of engineers
in the U.S. with the goal of finding high-leverage policies to improve the current situation. They believe
that this problem is extremely salient to most U.S. based engineering and information technology firms.
They also believe that this is a "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968) that cannot be addressed by
companies individually.
Since the completion of the class based project in the spring of 2008, Boeing and I have discussed the
formation of a collaborative to use modeling to understand all issues surrounding the health of the U.S.
science and technology enterprise. The goal of this effort would be to bring together stakeholders from
industry, academia, K-12 education, and government to jointly explore problems of national importance
in a "model-centric" way. A principle held by those participating in such an initiative would be that
allowing stakeholders to communicate and debate their beliefs through the exploration of simulating
social-science models, rather than simply rhetoric, would facilitate communication and alignment. An
initial collaborative effort includes Boeing and Sandia National Laboratories. I have presented this work
to multiple audiences and will continue to refine the content in preparation for a coordinated presentation
later this year to promote the larger effort.
1.5 Methodology
1.5.1 System Dynamics Modeling
System dynamics models apply control theory to aid in the understanding of social systems. Building a
model is usually done by first creating a diagram of causal relationships and feedback loops and then
translating the conceptual model into a set of time-based ordinary differential equations that can be
simulated to capture the model's dynamic behavior. Going through the process of modeling allows one to
explore and gain insight into the functioning of a real-world system's behavior by performing tests that
are infeasible in the real world. This process is useful when trying to explore the long-term behavior
caused by complicated relationships across institutional boundaries. System dynamics models differ from
more commonly used types of models (such as spreadsheets models) because they adequately capture
time delays, represent feedback loops, and do not rely on assumptions of linearity.
(Appendices in this report contain both the block diagrams and equation listings for the model presented
here.)
An important aspect of an inductive (theory creating) modeling process (Christensen, 2006) (George, et
al., 2005) (Van Evera, 1997) is that it allows (and enforces) consistency of thought. Modeling can be a
good way of confronting ideological and "sound bite" based arguments. Forcing people to express
opinions about the relationships governing the 'physics' of a social system through a collective modeling
effort can allow multiple opinions and perspectives to be tested alongside one another in a way that would
be impossible through real social experimentation.
Models embody theories about how the world is structured. Simulating the dynamic behavior of models
over time forces the theorist to improve the model until it can generate results that are useful, plausible,
and maintain internal consistency. This can lead to new insights about the way the real world behaves.
While all models are oversimplifications, the goal is to create a caricature of the world that is useful in
solving or developing ideas to solve pertinent problems.
Readers who wish to better understand the field of system dynamics and how system dynamics models
are created and used are encouraged to read Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a
Complex World by John D. Sterman (Sterman, 2000), and Principles of Systems by Jay W. Forrester.
(Forrester, 1971) The main journal covering the field is the "System Dynamics Review."
1.5.2 System Dynamics in this Project
System dynamics modeling was chosen for studying this problem because its strengths include situations
when:
* The structure of the system is fairly well understood, but its complex behavior is not.
* 'Macro' level aggregations are acceptable as representations of the system.
* Dynamic behavior emerges over large time-horizons.
* Relationships contain feedback and non-linearity.
All of these criteria were met. Individual relationships between government, industry, academia, and K-
12 education can be described fairly easily. What is not understood is how those institutions evolve over
time as a result of their interactions with each other. Given the problem statement, it is appropriate to
model student behavior and the functioning of the economy in the aggregate. The emergent behavior this
model will try to shed light on unfolds over years and decades rather than weeks and quarters. Finally,
the institutions that make up the system of study all influence each other simultaneously.
This project involved iteratively reviewing literature and collecting subject matter expert opinion over
time. The model was developed through several stages of refinement. At every stage, insights about the
system derived from model simulation were used to plan further development and experimentation. The
ultimate goal was to come to a better understanding of the causal mechanisms behind what appears to be a
market failure. The final model presented here is a culmination of these efforts.
This model is incomplete, as any model representing a complex system will always be. This should not
be confused with invalid. Although still a research tool, it has reached a stage that gives confidence that
the insights gained by using it should be considered and further tested. One drawback to the model is that
it does not adequately endogenize macroeconomic behavior of the U.S. economy. Integrating this model
into a model of the national economy might make it possible to tune parameters to more accurately
reproduce historical behavior in a quantitative sense. If that is done, it is possible to have some
confidence in point predictions made for future system states. Even at this stage however, it is possible to
observe behavior in the model that is qualitatively similar to the phenomena under study. The true goal of
a model is not to perfectly reproduce historical behavior. No model can truly be verified or validated.
(Sterman, 2000 p. 846) Rather, the goal of a model is to give insight that allows one to better understand
the system and make more effective choices when devising policies that are capable of affecting positive
change.
1.6 Common Explanations
The first task undertaken in this effort was to gather common opinion about why the problem is occurring.
I asked more than 50 ordinary people their opinion on why students would not study a subject that was so
lucrative, and why such a dramatic decline would occur between 1985 and 2008. It was hoped that my
informal sample of public opinion might generate some useful hypotheses that could be explored in a
model. Opinions that were commonly given include the following:
* Children today are lazier than they used to be, they used to have better work ethic. This is the
"me generation."
* Parents are more permissive than they used to be, they either don't drive children hard enough
because they "want them to be happy," or they don't pay enough attention at all.
* People raised in poverty will go into (or push their children into) professions that promise
comfort but people raised in comfort will feel no such urgency. Because kids today have
everything they need and want, they aren't motivated to study hard subjects with the hope of
future return.
* People today fear the prospect of putting time and effort into studying science and technology,
only to see all of the jobs in those fields outsourced to developing countries.
* STEM workers are not perceived as nationally important like they were during the Cold War.
(Sputnik effect.)
* It has something to do with increased participation of women in higher education and their
relative tendency not to pursue engineering degrees.
* STEM workers are not respected like doctors or lawyers.
* STEM workers are not 'cool' like rock stars and basketball players.
* STEM subjects are harder to grasp and require more homework and time spent out of class.
* STEM subjects are not as interesting as non-STEM subjects.
* STEM subjects are for nerds. The opposite sex will not find you appealing.
* There isn't as much need for engineers and scientists because computers and automation continue
to make the design process so much easier.
* You can make more money in other fields such as business, law, medicine, etc.
Some of these opinions are more valid than others. Many of these common opinions will be disputed
throughout the course of this research paper. One that already has been rejected is the idea that a person
can make more money by studying other subjects. Even if this opinion is unjustified however, it still
could have a causal impact on the number of students leaving STEM if it is widely held. Although some
of these opinions may be valid, it is important to question whether any could really cause the behavior
present in the system, and whether they have really changed very much since 1985.
1.7 A Note on Blame
One thing that must be stated clearly is that there is no individual or group that can be directly blamed for
the problems presented in this research. The architecture of this system is defined by the structural
relationships between stakeholders in K-12 education, academia, industry, local government, and federal
government, as well as the implicit policies embedded in those relationships. The complex behavior of
this multi-stakeholder system brings about the results presented here. Everyone in the system can be
behaving rationally and with good intentions and still produce these dynamics. When discussing this
problem, it is common to hear assignments of blame to various parties including government officials,
corporations, teachers, unions, foreign competition, and (most disturbingly and commonly) even to
children. Blaming individuals or groups in this way is not an effective way to understand what is actually
happening so that the system may be reformed. The intent of this work is not to find one individual or
group that can be directly blamed for the problems but rather to better understand how the structure of this
complex system relates to the undesirable patterns we observe.
2 Building a Conceptual Model
2.1 Exploring Supply and Demand for STEM Talent
2.1.1 Current Engineering Wages
America's continued economic strength relies on its ability to lead the world in scientific and
technological advance. This, in-turn, depends upon a healthy base of indigenously educated technologists.
Opportunities for American engineers and scientists abound. A longitudinal study conducted by the
National Center for Education Statistics found that people who got Bachelor's degrees in STEM subjects
earn over ten-thousand dollars more per year than their non-STEM counterparts. Engineering and
computer science degree holders fared the best, earning a substantial premium above all other college
graduates. (NCES, 2008). This study contained the following table demonstrating the point:
Salaries of full-time employees
Total
Engineering
Computer science
Business and management
Health
Biological sciences
Mathematics/physical sciences
Social and behavioral science
Arts and humanities
Education
All STEM fields
Non-STEM fields
by degree type and number of years since degree earned
1-2 years (1994) 4-5 years (1997) 9-10 years (2003)
$30,800 $39,900 $60,600
38,900 51,400 74,900
33,400 50,400 72,600
'33,800 43,400 65,900
40,500 45,600 65,000
29,200 33,900 62,200
27,100 37,800 58,200
26,900 39,200 62,300
25,000 33,600 52,800
26,600 31,700 43,800
33,800 45,600 68,300
30,200 38,800 58,900
Salary Data by Degree Type
In addition to significant financial reward, high-skilled technical work offers career potential,
opportunities for creativity, and other life-style amenities that are attractive to many. The same study
found that during all three periods, engineers and computer scientists held the highest levels of belief that
their current job had "career potential." STEM degree earners held these beliefs more strongly than those
without STEM degrees. These careers provide remarkably stability as well. The NSF reported that
unemployment among scientists and engineers reached a low in 2006 of 2.5%. (Kannankutty, 2008)
2.1.2 Historical Engineering Wages
Engineering wages have risen relative to other wages in the economy in the past 100 years as the value of
information and knowledge increased. It is now estimated that the value of the information embedded in
products as a proportion of cost of production is now higher than it has ever been. (Landes, et al., 2003)
The following chart copied from (Herrnstein, et al., 1996 p. 93) shows that relative wages of engineers
and manufacturing employees diverged widely over the course of the 1950's:
Table 1: Longitudinal
Figure 1: Historical Wages for Engineering and Manufacturing Jobs
The difference between median engineering wages and the U.S. median wage is substantial. Although
engineering wages are not rising dramatically relative to median wages as they did during the 1950's and
1960's, engineers continue to do well financially. Since 1970 engineers have earned between 3 times and
4 times American median wages. It should be noted that this data only includes averages for the
profession, not the type of degree earned. It therefore does not account for people earning Bachelor's
degrees in engineering who then go into management, law, or finance for instance. Recently there has
also been a tendency for Wall Street to compete with engineering firms over graduates with strong
quantitative skills. Many engineering graduates today are going directly into finance and banking. The
willingness of financial firms to 'poach' engineers and retrain them may be indicative of an overall
shortage of quantitative skills among the college graduates relative to demand.
Data used to generate the following charts were extracted from various sources:
* U.S. median salaries were extracted from (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006)
* Median salaries for engineers were extracted from (Scientific Manpower Commission, 1967 -
current)
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Figure 2: Historical Median Engineering and Average U.S. Wages
Figure 3: Historical Median Engineering and Average U.S. Wages in 2006 Dollars
Historical Median Wages (2006 Dollars)
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2.1.3 Engineering Graduations
Despite the attractiveness of science and technology careers, there is evidence that American dominance
in science and engineering may be threatened by a shortage of highly skilled technical labor. Many
industrial and information technology companies are concerned that they will not be able to hire enough
scientists and engineers to replace domestic retirements and to meet business growth demands. The
impending exodus of 'Baby Boomer' technologists may exacerbate the current shortfalls and may cause
STEM wages to continue to climb further. Surprisingly however, younger generations are increasingly
unwilling to study STEM. Despite the pronounced pay disparity, the number and percentage of
Americans graduating with engineering degrees has been trending downwards since 1985. The
percentage of Bachelor's engineering degrees dropped from 8% to 4.5% over the course of that time.
(NAE, 2007) The disparity between impending retirements and indigenous replacements has been
described by the National Academies as a "Gathering Storm" (NAE, 2007) that may sap America's
strength in those fields.
The following charts provide information about trends related to the percentage of people attending
college and the popularity of different undergraduate majors over time.
Data used to generate the charts in the next few sections were extracted from various sources:
* All information about the number of students earning different undergraduate degree types on a
yearly basis, either in total or by gender, can be found online in the NSF WebCASPAR system.
See bibliography entry for (National Science Foundation WebCASPAR System).
* All information about the number of 22 year olds in the U.S. population during a given year was
extracted from the U.S. Census Bureau web site from various current and archival population
estimates. See bibliography entry for (U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates).
22 Year-old Populations
4,500,000
4,000,000
3,500,000
3,000,000
2,500,000
2,000,000
1,500,000
1,000,000
500,000
0
R* 00 (N
N. N 000d 0~) Of~~
t-0 0 It
00 0) C0)o0) 0*1 M~
T- 4 r- -4
oo (D or
- Engineering Graduates
-All College Graduates
-Total number of 22 year old
22 Year-old Percentages
40.000%
35.000%
30.000%
25.000%
20.000%
15.000%
10.000%
5.000%
0.000%
0 0 Iqt 00 (N 0 It 00 M
0 i r- r_ 00 00 0 O o 0
o) O n ) O O O 0) 0) O 0
- Engineering Graduates as % of 22
Year-old Population
- All College Graduates as % of 22
Year-old Population
Figure 4: College Attendance
As the 'baby-boomers' came of age, the total 22
year old population swelled. A peak occurred
around 1980. Since then, the population of 22
year olds has fluctuated between 3.5 million and
4.25 million.
The number of people earning college degrees has
tripled from 500,000 to 1,500,000.
Figure 5: College Attendance Percentages
Over the course of this time period, the percentage
of the population earning undergraduate degrees
grew from 20% to 35% of the population.
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Figure 7: Engineering Graduation College Percentage
Figure 6: Engineering Graduation
Numbers
This fast growth has not penetrated
the engineering profession however.
The number of degrees awarded in
engineering rose from 36,000 to
78,000 in 1985. It then dropped until
it hit a minimum of 59,000 in 2001
and then started to rise again.
Unfortunately, this rise after 2001
does not reflect renewed interest, but
rather a recent demographic influx.
The percentage of undergraduates
earning degrees in engineering fields
peaked in the year 1985 at 7.83%. It
has declined most years between 1985
and 2006, and is now at 4.54%.
Although not depicted here, the
percentage of students receiving
degrees in computer science also
experienced a peak in 1986.
It should be noted that the percentage
of foreign-born students in American
universities rose over this time period,
and that foreign-born students
disproportionately study STEM. This
fact potentially masks numbers that
would look even worse for American
born students.
2.500% Figure 8: Engineering Graduation
Percentage
2.000% The percentage of all people college
age people earning engineering
1.500% degrees has been trending downward
since the mid 1980's as well.
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International Comparison
The following chart showing data provided by the National Science Board that can be found in (NAE,
2007 p. 100). It shows the weakness of the U.S. relative to other nations in the percentage all 24 year olds
who hold college degrees in STEM subjects.
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Figure 9: International Percentage of College Degrees in Engineering
U.S. higher educational institutions are considered the best in the world. Rapid declines in STEM interest
among U.S. born students and weakness compared to international STEM graduation have created a good
deal of unused capacity in engineering and science programs at the graduate level. This has necessitated
the importation of foreign students to populate graduate programs. Fully fifty five percent of engineering
doctoral students in the U.S. are now foreign born. (NAE, 2007 p. 35)
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2.1.4 Gender Issues
The fraction of women in engineering is lower than in most other professions. It is reasonable to wonder
what impact the increasing percentage of women in college has had on the overall percentage of
university graduates earning engineering degrees. It is plausible to suspect that increasing female
university enrollment combined with their relative tendency not to study engineering could be responsible
for a decreasing percentage of graduates earning engineering degrees. This issue will be explored in the
graphs below:
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Figure 10: College Graduation by Gender
In the mid 1980's the number of women earning
Bachelor's degrees passed the number of men.
Today 800,000 women earn Bachelor's degrees
while only 600,000 men do.
Figure 11: Engineering Graduation by Gender
The number of women earning degrees in
engineering was negligible until 1975. The period
from 1975 to 1985 saw a significant influx of
women into the field. Growth was arrested
thereafter. This ten year period occurred because
of larger social trends related to the liberalization
of gender roles in the workforce.
The shape of the curve of total engineering
Bachelor's degrees is caused more by wild
fluctuations in the number of men than the
influence of women, because of their respective
sizes in the population.
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Figure 12: Female Engineering Degrees
This graph shows the number of women earning
degrees in engineering on a larger scale. The
number of women earning degrees also peaked in
1987, but went down thereafter and reached a
local minimum in 1992. It began to recover
earlier than the number of males in the field,
surpassed the 1987 peak in 1997, and continued to
rise thereafter.
Figure 13: Engineering Percentage by Gender
The percentage of men in college studying
engineering fluctuated wildly during this period.
The percentage of women went from negligible to
approximately 2% over this time.
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Figure 14: Female Engineering Percentage
This graph shows the percentage of women
(relative to all college going women) earning
degrees in engineering on a larger scale. Women
after 1985 show the same general tendency of
decline as men.
Figure 15: Ratio of Female To Male
Engineering Preference
The ratio of percentage of women choosing
engineering relative to the percentage of men
choosing engineering indicates that engineering
has become more popular with women than it has
with men over time.
The previous graphs have demonstrated that although increased participation of women may be a solution
to the problem of weaker interest in engineering, it is not a cause of the tendency toward decline that has
been witnessed between 1985 and today.
In fact, although there is obviously a gender related influence causing there to be fewer females than
males in engineering, one or more strong influences are causing movement in the percentages of people
choosing engineering that operates independently of gender. These effects are visible in the data for both
men and women at the same time.
2.2 First Conceptual Model: Invisible Hand Loops
Based on the above discussion, a first conceptual model will be presented that embodies supply and
demand forces that produce engineers and impact the number of jobs available in the economy:
Pay of Non-STEM Number of
workers Engineering Jobs
Attractiveness of Average
En ineering Engineer pay
B-
Labor
supply
and
demand
STEM Track Engineers
Student.
Figure 16: Labor Supply and Demand Conceptual Balancing Loop
The loop in this model represents an economic "Invisible Hand" regulating the number of people
choosing to enter engineering. Arrows indicate causal relationships and polarities on those arrows
indicate a positive or negative influence associated with that relationship. As the pay and benefits of the
average engineer rise relative to the pay of workers in a non STEM fields, the attractiveness of
engineering careers go up. If these jobs become more attractive, more students at every level will study
the courses needed to allow them to enter a technically-oriented career either because they are attracted by
those wages, or because their parents make them. After a delay associated with going through the
educational process, these students emerge to cause an increase in the number of engineers. As more
engineers enter the economy however, it will tend to depress wages if the demand for engineers remains
the same. The wages of engineers in this model are determined by a simple supply vs. demand
relationship. If the available jobs go up or the number of engineers goes down, then wages rise as
employers bid up the price of those skills. Likewise, if the number of jobs goes down or the number of
engineers goes up, wages go down (or at least increase at a slower rate) relative to the other jobs in the
economy.
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Figure 17: Availability of Engineering Jobs Conceptual Balancing Loop
A second conceptual loop has been added to the model to more accurately reflect the fact that as wages go
up, employers provide a decreased number of jobs as they find substitutes, cut back on goals, or merely
do without. Likewise, if wages in a profession decrease, employers will create more jobs because of the
new profit potential associated with those decreased wages. In this simulation model supply and demand
curve are implemented as non-linear lookup tables.
These two loops combine to complete a dynamic picture of the 'Invisible Hand' in action. This balancing
feedback relationship brings stability to the system and generally causes the economy to respond to
fluctuations in demand in a reasonable way. Many economists would tell you that the market for STEM
labor should be functioning effectively because they only tend to consider the impact of these two
important loops and the impacts of other structure such as collective bargaining agreements in the case of
unions or cartel-like behavior on the part of physicians. Unlike these other examples, the market for
engineering talent is relatively unhindered. Because the market for engineering talent does not appear to
be functioning correctly however, we must continue exploring additional structure that could bring about
pathological behavior.
2.3 Exploring the STEM Education Pipeline
The nature of the delay between increased student interest in STEM fields and the emergence of
additional engineers must be more clearly understood.
Rising Above the Gathering Storm, it is articulated that:
Student interest in research careers is dampened by several factors. First,
there are important prerequisites for science and engineering study.
Students who choose not to or are unable to finish algebra 1 before 9th-
grade- which is needed for them to proceed in high school to geometry,
algebra 2, trigonometry, and pre-calculus--effectively shut themselves
out of careers in the sciences. In contrast, the decision to pursue a career
in law or business typically can wait until the junior or senior year of
college, when students begin to commit to postgraduate entrance
examinations.
Science and engineering education has a unique hierarchical nature that
requires academic preparation for advanced study to begin in middle
school. Only recently have US schools begun to require algebra in the
8th-grade curriculum.
(NAE, 2007 p. 102)
The fact that the ability to enter a profession requiring advanced mathematical training is dependent upon
decisions made in the 8t grade or earlier has important implications. All educators interviewed over the
course of this investigation agreed with its validity. Students who stopped studying mathematics at any
point in their educational career almost never entered the engineering profession because the entry
barriers were too high. Many argued that the decision points may be even earlier. Numerical concepts
must be mastered before a student can effectively learn algebra. If they are not, a student may have fallen
out of the "STEM Pipeline" prior to entering middle school.
The only point of discussion raised by some was to question whether this was an innate feature in
mathematical knowledge, or whether it resulted from the way mathematics education and institutions of
learning were structured. Most agreed that much of the effect had to do with the inherent nature of
mathematics itself, and that a societal attempt to add "re-entry points" to the system might mitigate the
problem somewhat.
In order to calibrate our model, studies were found which reported student interest in STEM and rates of
progression or falloff at different levels. This gave a crude way to estimate parameters when creating
initial models of the system. One extremely useful source of parameter information is the paper titled
"An Analytical Control System Model of Undergraduate Engineering Education" by Grismore, Hurtig,
and Farbrother. (Grismore, et al., 2003) This paper presents a control system model to estimate the
efficacy of school improvement at different grade levels to improve total STEM throughput. The
following two tables are drawn from that paper.
This table shows students losing interest and dropping off fairly rapidly in the high-school and college
years. Numbers presented are for the cohort graduating from college in 1984:
Student interest and pursuit of careers in natural sciences and engineering
Stage Year Number of Students
All high school sophomores (baseline) 1977 4,000,000
High school sophomores reporting interest 1977 730,000
in natural sciences and engineering.
High school seniors reporting interest in 1979 590,000
natural sciences and engineering.
College freshmen with intention to study 1980 340,000
natural sciences and engineering.
B.S. Graduates in natural sciences and 1984 208,000(78,000 engineers)
Table 2: Declining STEM Interest in Higher Grade Levels
This next table presents estimates provided by the National Center of Education Statistics (NCES) for the
percentage of people who continue moving through the pipeline at varying stages. This study was
published in 1998 and is also found in (Grismore, et al., 2003):
Retention Rates in the Engineering Pipeline
Note: MPC stands for Math-Physics-Chemistry
Fraction of middle school graduates 18%
prepared to take high school MPC courses
Fraction of middle school graduates
prepared to take high school MPC courses 75%
who actually enroll in those courses
Fraction of high school students who
actually complete the MPC courses (high 81%
school pathway retention)
The fraction of high school students having
taken all MPC courses who actually enroll in 22%
engineering
Fraction of engineering enrollees who
actually complete the educational program 61%
requirements. (engineering retention)
Table 3: STEM Pipeline Drop-off at Different Grade Levels
One of the most devastating things to take note of is that 82% of students fall out of the pipeline
sometime prior to leaving junior high schooL
2.4 Second Conceptual Model: The STEM Gauntlet
Based on the above discussion, the conceptual model was modified to more fully articulate the structure
of the STEM pipeline:
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Figure 18: STEM Gauntlet Conceptual Structure
The above model represents a system dynamics "stock and flow" structure. People are stored in stocks
represented by boxes andflow through different stages in the system. In this picture people start as babies
and flow into kindergarten, flow through the rest of the educational pipeline, and then flow into the stock
of engineers. Notice also that people can flow out of any stage into a "cloud". These people have fallen
out of the STEM pipeline most likely never to return. As discussed previously, the unique nature of
mathematics education makes it extremely hard to return once this occurs. Therefore, this model assumes
that if a person has fallen out of the system, they do not re-enter. This is fundamentally different from the
nature of building knowledge in humanities fields that lack vertically structured chains of knowledge
dependencies (NAE, 2007 p. 115), and therefore have lower barriers to entry.
The STEM pipeline structure is therefore been re-designated as the "STEM Gauntlet" in reference to the
concept of "running the gauntlet." This was a form of corporal punishment in which a soldier was forced
to walk or run through a column of people that beat him at every step. If the individual made it through
the gauntlet his life may have been spared and sins forgiven. If he did not, he may have been beaten to
death. The slower a person moved, the more likely he was to die.
A student may be considered to have fallen off the pipeline even if they are still taking STEM subjects in
school. This would be the case if they are taking courses that are not rigorous enough to enable them to
eventually succeed in a university level science or engineering program. In order to better visualize the
functioning of the pipeline, the following picture superimposes a crude picture of the subjects that must
be learned at each stage with the number of students that complete and adequately learn those subjects
within the timeframe necessary to continue to the next stage:
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Figure 19: STEM Gauntlet Conceptual Structure with Subject Matter and Student Interest
The vertical nature of mathematics knowledge means that the production of engineers is subject to longer
periods of delay than many other professions. The effect of a "signal" to increase "production" of
engineers, caused by an increase in availability of jobs and rising wages, will not be fully felt until
decades later because of this incredibly long pipeline in which reentry is not allowed. Although
economic signals can convince STEM trained individuals to switch industries or gravitate towards other
subjects, the stock of STEM capable individuals in the economy cannot be easily enlarged by transfers
from other fields. Delays such as this limit the effectiveness of short-term economic signaling
mechanisms because although they can cause a reallocation of existing STEM skills, they cannot increase
the overall pool of STEM capable workers in the short term. This fact can be responsible for
unresponsiveness in the short term and potentially lead to unstable or oscillating behavior in the long
term.
2.5 Third Conceptual Model: Invisible Hand Loops with STEM
Gauntlet
Now, the two models presented previously must be combined into a single structure. This combined
model is depicted here:
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Figure 20: Supply and Demand Loops and STEM Gauntlet Combined
Now, instead of "Attractiveness of Engineering" directly causing an increase in the number of STEM
track students, it instead is shown to reduce the outflow of potential STEM students (hence the negative
polarity) into a cloud because they continue to stay interested in STEM. Decreasing this outflow has the
effect of causing more people to go to the next stage, and ultimately more people emerge from the end
into the pool of Engineers in later years. Although the STEM gauntlet is depicted here as a single stock
of students, it is easy to imagine how the full gauntlet relates to the invisible hand structure in the
simulation version of the model. The outflow in every grade is regulated by the "Attractiveness of
Engineering." The current amount of outflow into the pool of engineers will be the result not of the
present level "Attractiveness of Engineering," but of the level for "Attractiveness of Engineering" over
the course of seventeen years. Over the course of this seventeen year period, "Attractiveness of
Engineering" changed because wages and job levels moved. Its level was based in part on the number of
engineers that had graduated from previous educational cohorts.
2.6 Exploring STEM Education
So far, student behavior has been examined only in terms of economic choices they (or those around
them) make in response to the wage premium paid to engineers while they are in school. This has been
the only determinant of the number of engineers or STEM workers that make it through the gauntlet. It 
is
now important to examine other factors that may influence the retention rate of the STEM pipeline.
Student achievement in mathematics and science subjects should be related to gauntlet drop-off rates.
This section examines American student performance in mathematics and science subjects relative to
other countries to observe trends.
2.6.1 Student Performance
A commonly cited work that gauges subject matter performance internationally is the "Trends in
International Mathematics and Science Study" (TIMSS) that is conducted by the International Association
for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). According to the National Center for Education
Statistics, TIMSS "provides reliable and timely data on the mathematics and science achievement of U.S.
students compared to that of students in other countries." (NCES TIMMS Web site)
TIMSS has measured performance at the fourth, eighth, and twelfth grade levels in different years.
Results have not been positive. Although U.S. fourth graders performed better than average and eighth
graders performed close to the international average, twelfth graders scored well below the international
average. The following table found in shows the average TIMSS scores of students from different
countries (NAE, 2007 p. 132).
TIMMS 1995 Twelfth Grade Average Scores
Mathematics Physics
France 557 Norway 581
Russian Federation 542 Sweden 573
Switzerland 533 Russian Federation 545
Australia 525 Germany 522
Cyprus 518 Australia 518
Lithuania 516 International Average 501
Greece 513 Cyprus 494
Sweden 512 Latvia 488
Canada 509 Switzerland 488
International Average 501 Greece 486
Italy 474 Canada 485
Czeck Republic 469 France 466
Germany 465 Czeck Republic 451
United States 442 Austria 435
Austria 436 United States 423
Table 4: International Math and Physics Performance
After results of this test were released, the U.S. Department of Education released a number of statements
that can be found online at (Archived US Dept. Education TIMMS Responses). One statement contained
the following:
Today's release of 12th-grade results shows that U.S. students' standing
relative to other TIMSS countries continues to decline in the high school
years. A comparison of U.S. 12th graders' general mathematics and
science knowledge to students in 20 other nations shows that our
students scored below the international average in both topics and
exceeded the performance of only two nations. A separate examination
of advanced mathematics and physics comparing our students taking pre-
calculus or calculus and our students taking physics with advanced
mathematics and physics students in other nations shows that the
performance of our advanced students is among the lowest of countries
participating in TIMSS.
Of 21 countries, the only two that the U.S. "significantly outperformed" in mathematics were Cyprus and
South Africa.
These reports state that this was not a case of high-achievement among some and poor achievement
among others. It states that "the entire distribution of U.S. scores is shifted downward from that of many
of the high performing countries."
Another release put out by the National Center for Education Statistics stated that:
TIMSS showed very low results for US students compared to those in the
other countries giving the tests, both for general knowledge by average
graduating seniors and for advanced performance by seniors studying
physics and calculus. A recent report, Facing the Consequences, from
the US TIMSS Research Center suggested that these results were
certainly to be expected. It pointed out that there was a consistent decline
in our relative standing from fourth grade to eighth grade in both
mathematics and science. Of the almost 40 topics examined in both
mathematics and science, none showed improved standing relative to
other TIMSS countries from fourth to eighth grade. Most topics showed
a decline over the middle school years.
Schmidt said, "It could hardly be a surprise to find this decline
continuing on through high school. As we discussed in Facing the
Consequences and in our earlier report A Splintered Vision, US curricula
through eighth grade do not focus on any key topics or give them
significantly more attention. Those curricula and our textbooks are
highly repetitive and unchallenging in grade after grade of the middle
school years. How could they provide a sound foundation on which to
build during the high school years?" The middle school curricula in most
TIMSS countries cover topics from algebra, geometry, physics and
chemistry. For most US students these are first studied, if at all, in high
school. Many students (about 15 percent) never study algebra, geometry
(about 30 percent), advanced algebra (40 percent), other advanced
mathematics (around 80 percent), chemistry (about 45 percent) or
physics (almost 75 percent).
Schmidt indicated, "US students frequently opt out of advanced study of
mathematics and science in high school or are placed in less demanding
courses even if they do continue to take mathematics and science
courses. So high school mathematics and science is unlikely to overcome
the poor foundation provided during US middle school education and
reverse the downward trend in comparative performance for average
students."
Since the initial test, U.S. students have scored marginally better, but international scores have also risen,
meaning that U.S. relative rank has not moved appreciably.
2.6.2 A Side-Note on Biological and Agricultural Sciences
Unlike engineering, the number of people entering the biological sciences has grown significantly since
1985 despite the fact that biologists and agricultural scientists are paid much less than other types of
STEM workers. This difference is so great that the National Science Board has recognized a significant
bifurcation between wage level, benefits, and career opportunities for those in life-sciences and those in
chemistry, physics, mathematics, computer sciences, and engineering. (National Science Board, 2004)
Despite the obvious economic benefit of going into the "dead"-sciences, an increasing number of STEM
inclined people are choosing those professions which offer the least economic reward instead. One
difference between biological sciences and the others just mentioned is that organic systems are much
more complicated than systems studied or created by other STEM workers. Because biological systems
are less well understood, the learning content of a biological education today focuses more on descriptive
rather than normative theories and requires relatively more statistics than calculus. Whereas an
introductory physics course forces students to learn theories, rules, and principles, introductory biology
classes must focus more on memorization of large bodies of knowledge. Physicists and engineers
generally must study mathematics through differential equations, linear algebra, and beyond. In contrast,
most biology undergraduate programs require only one semester of calculus. The fact that more people
inclined towards STEM choose biology today rather than engineering may result partially from weaker
confidence in the types of mathematics with strong sequential dependencies. As biology becomes
increasingly focused on computation, this may change.
2.6.3 Teacher Quality: Primary Determinant of Student Performance
If American performance in STEM subjects at the K-12 level is so poor relative to other countries, the
obvious question is: "Why?" A variety of studies have found that when other factors are controlled for,
student outcomes correlate very strongly with the characteristics of individual teachers. Schater and
Thum note that "[i]n the last decade, a series of studies has confirmed that access to an effective teacher is
the single most school related factor responsible for increased learning." They state that "[w]hen
compared to virtually every other school reform effort to date (e.g. class size reduction, charter schools,
vouchers, direct instruction, technology, etc.), students who have effective teachers achieve the most."
(Schater, et al., 2004) In fact, high quality educators have even been found to mitigate many of the
effects of negative socio-economic influences such as poverty. Schater and Thum find that "[q]uality
teaching produced a 0.91 standard deviation gain in students' achievement, which approaches mitigating
the effects of students' home environment (1.61), prior knowledge (0.92), or parental income (0.67)."
(Schater, et al., 2004) Hanuschek notes that "a good teacher will gain one and a half grade-level
equivalents whereas a bad teacher will get a gain of only half a year." (Hanushek) Rockoff finds that "A
one-standard-deviation increase in teacher quality raises test scores by approximately 0.1 standard
deviations in reading and math on nationally standardized distributions of achievement" (Rockoff, 2004)
Rivkin, Hanuschek and Kain find that "moving from an average teacher to one at the 85th percentile of
teacher quality (i.e., moving up one standard deviation in teacher quality) increases student achievement
gains by more than 4 percentile ranks in the given year. With their data, this is roughly equivalent to the
effects of a ten student (approximately 50%) decrease in class size." (Rivkin, et al., 2005) Teacher
quality is a higher leverage point than student-teacher ratio, per-pupil spending, or any other school-
related lever.
2.6.4 What Is Teacher Quality?
Given the importance of teacher quality on student outcomes, it is logical to ask what teacher quality is
and how it is measured. Teacher quality at the individual level is easy to observe but nearly impossible to
quantify because teaching is a creative and entrepreneurial endeavor. As is the case for most knowledge
workers, reliable objective metrics for teacher quality are hard to create and gather. A large portion of the
attributes that make a teacher effective are subjective in nature. Teaching is fundamentally different from
rote-tasks such as assembly-line work, and attempts to impose simplistic formulas to gauge performance
are an insult to the educational profession. Many economists therefore simply risk tautology by defining
teacher quality as that which causes a relative improvement in students' performance over time.
Hanuschek and Rivkin call this "outcome-based measures of quality." They have written a very good
summary of the current state of research on teacher quality as chapter 18 of the Handbook of the
Economics ofEducation. (Hanushek, et al., 2006) In this work they summarize the current state of
research attempting to determine the impact that teacher, school related, and socio-economic parameters
have on student outcomes. As discussed in the previous section, an emerging consensus has determined
that teacher related attributes are much more significant than school related attributes, and can even
mitigate much of the impact of socio-economic impacts on student outcomes. These researchers have
focused in on which teacher related attributes can be found to correlate with student outcomes, and which
have no impact. Disambiguating the individual impacts of all of these factors is an enormous statistical
undertaking. Creating a better understanding teacher quality requires triangulation between imperfectly
measurable teacher attributes and imperfectly measurable student performance indicators in an attempt to
determine which correlations from one set have the most significance when mapped to the other. These
studies recognize that attributes correlating with teacher quality are only proxies for teacher quality. No
metric or set of metrics can accurately capture the quality of an individual teacher. Knowing the values of
each significant proxy for an individual teacher may give a very poor indication of how good that person
is in the classroom. In the aggregate however, these attributes can have a high degree of correspondence
with student outcomes. As a school administrator, knowing the averages for important teacher related
proxies would be a very good way of predicting student outcomes in that school.
As a side note, when studying teacher quality and student outcomes, or when trying to improve either, it
is extremely important not to rely on imperfect metrics in inappropriate ways. Doing so can actually
degrade quality by encouraging educators to cheat their students out of a quality education by simply
"teaching to the test" all year. Imperfect measures of teacher quality can cause teachers' career growth to
be tied to a series of meaningless rituals that have no bearing on the needs of their students. Such metrics
do much more to deter good people who might otherwise switch careers into teaching than they do to
raise the quality of the current stock of teachers. For instance, Angrist and Guryan actually found a
negative correlation between SAT score and PRAXIS II pass rates. (The PRAXIS II is a test widely used
in teacher certification.) This was found because teaching candidates that have not gone through teacher
education programs had higher SAT test scores than candidates that had gone through those programs.
(Angrist, et al.) They go on:
Recent years have seen an acceleration in the use of standardized tests to
certify teachers. Proponents hope these measures will increase quality,
but economists have long been skeptical of entry barriers that may shift
supply and discourage otherwise qualified applicants. Tests interact with
the American system of teacher education since many teacher-education
programs focus on getting students certified. Although students of
accredited and other teacher-education programs do better on the widely
used Praxis test, our estimates show no impact of testing on the type or
affiliation of teachers' undergraduate program or school. This is perhaps
desirable if teacher-education programs are seen as insufficiently
rigorous. On the other hand, there is also no evidence that testing hurdles
have raised the quality of new and inexperienced teachers, at least as
measured by undergraduate background.
(Angrist, et al.)
2.6.5 Judging the Proxies for Teacher Quality
This section will discuss which measurable teacher attributes have been found to correlate with teacher
quality and which have not. Unless otherwise noted, the information cited in this section has been drawn
from (Hanushek, et al., 2006). Studies have shown that the subjective opinion principals have of teachers
have been found to correlate very closely with objective measures of their students' educational
outcomes. (Rockoff, 2004) Other indicators that have been found to have higher correlations with student
outcomes and are more often studied include teacher performance on standardized tests such as the SAT,
ACT, or GRE. Many researchers cited in these and other studies assume that teacher quality is also
highly correlated with selectivity of the teacher's undergraduate institution and significant subject matter
expertise (Figlio, 1996), the teacher's college grades, and the teacher's college class rank. These
indicators of teacher quality are harder to do studies on however both because of a lack of data and
because college grades and class rank may not be objective measures. Results may be skewed by the fact
that classes offered in teacher education programs may have different levels of rigor than university
courses offered in other fields. Their quality may also change over time. It is therefore impossible for
studies that rely on the use of data-mining within large sample size databases to produce reliable
measurements in these cases. Ultimately, it is taken for granted by many that better students make better
teachers. These findings should not be very surprising.
Years of teaching experience have found to have a weak non-linear correlation with a quality. A
characteristic "learning curve" pattern has been found in some cases. One peculiar study found a normal
learning curve in vocabulary skills, but a learning curve with significant drop-off in the case of math
computation. This unexplained result showed that math teachers with three years of experience were
significantly better than first year math teachers, but teacher with nine years of experience were no better
than first year math teachers. Teacher quality in this study appeared to degrade over time after the three
year mark. (Rockoff, 2004)
Master's degrees have been found to have no correlation with quality. Salaries have been found not to
correlate with quality. Teacher certification only has a minimal correlation with quality. There is no
quality difference between teachers with full certifications and those with emergency certification.
Additional teacher training also has virtually no impact on student outcomes.
2.6.6 Teacher Quality in Decline
While it is impossible to track the abstract notion of 'teacher quality' over time, proxies that correlate
with it can be tracked in an attempt to pick up on observable trends. Many researchers tracking these
proxies have stated that teacher quality has declined significantly since the 1950s and experienced the
steepest drop during the 1970s and 1980s. (Hanushek, et al., 2002). Teacher quality in the 1940s and
1950s was quite high. Over 50 percent of teachers scored above the 80th percentile on various
standardized tests including IQ tests. By the 1970's this percentage had fallen to 30 percent, and by the
1990's it had fallen to 8-9 percent. (Bacolod, 2007) Observable drops in undergraduate GPA, class rank,
selectivity of undergraduate institution, and scores on standardized tests including the SAT, GRE, and
ACT have occurred over the course of this time period. Whereas teachers 50 years ago tended to be at the
top of their class, today, the SAT score of the typical teacher tends to correspond with a C+ average GPA.
(Angrist, et al.)
2.6.7 Teacher Qualification
In addition to general characteristics of a teacher's school and test-taking performance, another obvious
aspect of teacher quality is preparedness to teach a particular subject. The heaviest teacher shortages exist
in STEM subject areas. Consequently, STEM subjects are most likely to be taught by those unqualified
to teach them. Rising Against the Gathering Storm presents the following table and speaks to its content
(NAE, 2007 p. 115):
TABLE 5-1 Students in US Public Schools Taught by Teachers
with No Major or Certification in the Subject Taught, 1999-2000
Discipline Grades 5-8 Grades 9-12
English 58% 30%
Mathematics 69% 31%
Physical science 93% 63%
Biology-life sciences - 45%
Chemistry 61%
Physics - 67 %
Physical education 19% 19%
SOURCE: National Center for Education Statistics. Qualifications of the Public
School Teacher Workforce: Prevalence of Out-of-Field Teaching 1987-1988 to 1999-
2000. Washington, DC: US Department of Education, 2003.
Table 5: Percentage STEM Classes Taught by Unqualified Teachers
In the worst instance, sixty seven percent of physics classes are taught by teachers unqualified to teach the
subject. Of all STEM subjects, mathematics has the highest percentage of classrooms taught by teachers
certified in the field. What may be masked in this statistic however is the fact that many math teachers
have degrees in "Mathematics Education" rather than "Mathematics". These segregated programs may
produce teachers that are less capable in the subject than programs not specifically tailored for people
intending to enter the teaching profession.
Rising Against The Gathering Storm states that:
Today there is such a shortage of highly qualified K-12 teachers that
many of the nation's 15,000 school districts have hired uncertified or
underqualified teachers. Moreover, middle and high school mathematics
and science teachers are more likely than not to teach outside their own
fields of study. A US high school student has a 70% likelihood of being
taught English by a teacher with a degree in English but about a 40%
chance of studying chemistry with a teacher who was a chemistry major.
These problems are compounded by chronic shortages in the teaching
workforce. About two-thirds of the nation's K-12 teachers are expected
to retire or leave the profession over the coming decade, so the nation's
schools will need to fill between 1.7 million and 2.7 million positions
during that period, about 200,000 of them in secondary science and
mathematics classrooms.
We need to recruit, educate, and retain excellent K-12 teachers who
fundamentally understand biology, chemistry, physics, engineering, and
mathematics. The critical lack of technically trained people in the United
States can be traced directly to poor K-12 mathematics and science
instruction. Few factors are more important than this if the United States
is to compete successfully in the 21st century.
(NAE, 2007 p. 113)
Based on the above discussion it is necessary to consider two separate kinds of secondary school teacher
quality: that which makes someone a good educator in the general sense, and that which makes someone
qualified to teach the subject they are charged with. It is likely that many students have a poor teacher
who knows a STEM subject reasonably well or an exceptional history teacher attempting to teach physics.
Neither will be effective.
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Figure 21: STEM Gauntlet Highlighting Elementary School Deficiencies
Finally, it is crucial to recognize the role played by elementary level teachers during formative years
when basic numerical concepts must be mastered and interest in varying subjects is either encouraged or
squashed. The elementary school teacher is thought to be a generalist who understands early childhood
development and is also competent to teach all subjects at a rudimentary level. While not a subject matter
expert in STEM, this individual should be able to teach basic math and science subjects in a thorough and
compelling way to give students a foundation on which to build. Unfortunately, according to Dr. Bill
McDiarmid, Dean of the College of Education at UNC Chapel Hill, "we found that elementary teachers
tended to identify their trouble with & aversion to math with their decision to become elementary
teachers!"
Only 43% of a sample of elementary school teachers in a recent study could correctly simplify the
following fraction:
3 11 -
4 2
(Note: The answer is 3.5.) This numerical manipulation skill is something that is supposed to be taught in
the 4" or 5th grade. Furthermore, only 10% of those teachers could adequately explain what it meant
conceptually to divide by a fraction or give a real-world example. (Ma, 1999) (The same study found that
100% of Chinese elementary school teachers, with the equivalent of only a junior high school education
and two years of normal school, could solve the same problem and 90% had a strong grasp of the
conceptual underpinnings behind this and other math problems.) Because it is unreasonable to expect
children to master concepts that their teachers have not, it is logical to assume that a large fraction of
American students have fallen out of the STEM pipeline before they reach the age of 12 and enter junior
high school.
While it is certainly not necessary for an individual teaching elementary school students to have
completed a STEM degree, it seems reasonable to assume that to effectively teach a subject an individual
should have mastered material at least one conceptual step above that which is being taught. Someone
teaching numerical concepts in elementary school should have a thorough grasp of basic algebra.
Someone teaching basic algebra should have a thorough grasp of geometry, trigonometry and advanced
algebra or pre-calculus. The purpose of mastering material at least one step ahead of what is being taught
is that this ensures that the educator has not only an algorithmic foundation (deductive knowledge, or
knowledge the rules of symbol manipulation), but also understand the subject conceptually (inductive
knowledge, can derive the rules from real-world examples and experiences). A conceptual understanding
of material is essential to being adaptive in the classroom, to design pedagogical experiences that inspire
interest in students, and to effectively communicate the relevance of the material to their lives. The
devastating fact that Ling Ma demonstrated is that many of today's elementary school teachers may
themselves have fallen out of the STEM pipeline in elementary school. McDiarmid stated that they later
used this fact a basis for deciding to become elementary school teachers themselves.
A recent paper by Grishmore, Hurtig, and Farbrother analyzes the educational pipeline as a control
system and statistically estimates the impact of investment in improving pipeline retention at different
education levels. (Grismore, et al., 2003) They did this to determine where effort should be focused to
maximize the number of STEM workers that emerge at the end. The conclusion was that focus on the
earlier years - elementary and junior high - would most significantly impact on the number of people
leaving college with a STEM degree.
2.6.8 Student Behavior: Where Ability Meets Intent
The model so far is a very crude representation of human motivation. Although this "rational-actor"
caricature is true if all else is held equal, this assumes that other important forces besides the lure of future
economic wealth do not cause the system to move in other interesting directions.
Azjen and Fishbein's "Theory of Reasoned Action" (TRA) (Ajzen, et al., 1980) and Azjen's "Theory of
Planned Behavior" (Ajzen, 1985) offer some guidance on how to proceed when developing the model
further. These mathematical formulations from the field of social psychology attempts to tease apart and
separately represent the factors that can influence individual and aggregate behavior so that it is more
predictable. These theories structure multi-attribute utility equations inside matrices representing
different determinants of behavioral intention.
TRA differentiates between the individual's attitudes toward a behavior and that same individual's beliefs
about social norms held by others. The probability that a person will perform some action can be
predicted by understanding both their different beliefs about the positives and negatives associated with
that behavior, and their beliefs about how other people they deem important will judge them should they
take that action. This theory has been found to be a very good predictor of future actions in situations
when the individual has a high degree of control over the outcome. It has been found to have less
predictive ability in such situations when the individuals have less than perfect control over the outcome.
TPB was developed in response to the weaknesses in TRA. TPB is a superset of TRA that takes into
account how much perceived behavioral control a person has over that behavior in addition to attitude
toward behavior and belief about social norms. Studies using this formulation have been found to be
very good predictors of individual and group behavior in studies of smoking cessation, the use of birth
control, and academic performance.
At the highest level, these theories can be expressed thusly:
* Behavior is a function of Perceived Control and Intent
* Intent is a function of Personal Attitude and Belief about Social Norms
TPB offers a more realistic way of understanding behavior and intent than the "rational actor"
formulation of student motivation presented so far. For instance, in the survey results described in
(Grismore, et al., 2003), students displayed a declining interest in pursuing a STEM career over time. A
student who was interested in junior-high school but who is no longer interested in high school could be
reporting a lack of interest due to many things that could have happened in the intervening time period.
This student could have done poorly in a class due to lack of effort or bad instruction, thus reducing
perceived behavior control. The same student could have decided that other subjects were more
interesting or heard that you can make more money in other fields, thus altering personal attitude. The
effects of various considerations that might influence a student's decition to leave the STEM pipeline are
hard to disambiguate. What is clear is that a loss of perceived control will often mask itself as declining
interest or intent. While the system dyanamics model presented here will not incorporate the theory of
planned behavior in its formulation, it will incorporate aspects beyond a simple "rational-actor"
formulation in determining student outcomes.
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Figure 22: STEM Student Ability and Intent Conceptual Structure
This conceptual model determines a student's probability of falling out of the STEM pipeline by
combining the influence of two factors:
Ability or perceived control Quality of instruction in STEM subjects. Studies of student
outcomes have found that the quality of the educator has more
influence on student success than all other factors influencing the
educational environment. High quality instructors have even
been found to alleviate other factors outside the school such as a
negative home environment.
Individual attitude and social norms Belief about economic payoff based on current market conditions.
An older student in high-school or college may consider these
influences directly. A younger student may experience this
influence indirectly through parent or community influences.
Quality educators will also influence individual attitudes because
they can make the subject more engaging and seem more relevant
to the life of the student.
Table 6: Tracing Perceived Control, Attitudes, and Social Norms
This model is still simplistic and could be expanded in the future to incorporate other social factors to
improve its realism. It is believed however, that the two influences currently expressed in the model are
some of the strongest factors influencing student behavior either directly or indirectly. Furthermore, I
believe that while additional detail complexity may help with point predictions, it is unlikely that other
factors that influence pipeline retention will be found to have a strong negative correlation with either
teacher quality or financial reward. If anything, additional detail may further strengthen the loops that
will be explored below.
2.6.9 Determinants of Teacher Quality
2.6.9.1 Current and Historical Teacher Pay
The obvious first place to look when exploring why the U.S. has low quality teachers on average is to
look at teacher pay. The same chart shown above demonstrating that engineers and computer scientists
have the highest salaries in the U.S. also shows that educators have the lowest average yearly earnings of
all college graduates. Although they start slightly higher than those with degrees in arts and humanities,
increases over time do not keep pace, and salaries after ten years are almost ten-thousand dollars below
the next highest paid degree type (NCES, 2008):
Salaries of full-time employees by degree type and number of years since degree earned
1-2 years (1994) 4-5 years (1997) 9-10 years (2003)
Total $30,800 $39,900 $60,600
Engineering 38,900 51,400 74,900
Computer science 33,400 50,400 72,600
Business and management 33,800 43,400 65,900
Health 40,500 45,600 65,000
Biological sciences 29,200 33,900 62,200
Mathematics/physical sciences 27,100 37,800 58,200
Social and behavioral science 26,900 39,200 62,300
Arts and humanities 25,000 33,600 52,800
All STEM fields 33,800 45,600 68,300
Non-STEM fields 30,200 38,800 58,900
Table 7: Salaries by University Degree Type and Year since Graduation
Low teacher pay is an extremely plausible reason for low quality in the average K-12 educator. We must
also explore why there was such a decline in average teacher quality since the 1950's. The following
chart shows a rapid decline in teacher wages relative to other professionals with college degrees. In the
1940's both men and women could expect to earn more than the average college graduate if they chose to
teach (Hurley):
Teacher pay premium (or penalty) relative to other
college educated workers
Year Male Female
1940 3.60% 15.80%
1950 -2.10% 11.20%
1960 -19.70% 12.70%
1970 -33.10% 3.10%
1980 -36.10% 3.70%
1990 -37.50% -4.50%
2000 -60.40% -16.40%
Table 8: Teacher Pay Decline over Time
Today, the financial penalty is sixteen percent for females and 60 percent for males. However, this
aggregate level data does not take into account pay differentiation by non-teaching field. The opportunity
cost of an engineer or computer scientist choosing to teach may be in the range of eighty to one hundred
percent.
2.6.9.2 Gender Related Mobility
Another reason quality may have dropped over the course of this time is that liberalization of gender roles
opened opportunities for college educated women beyond the more traditional choices of teaching,
nursing, and social work. In the 1940's, 1950's, and 1960's the labor market for teachers operated
somewhat independently of the labor market in industry. The economist Peter Temin pointed out that
because women were a trapped labor pool, the wages of female teachers were compared against the
wages of other jobs available to women when making career choices. (Temin, 2002) As previously
pointed out, female teachers earned wages that were 15% higher than other choices available to college
educated women. These female teachers went to college and entered the workforce at a time when many
women did not. This means that they may have been somewhat more progressive people with high
motivation and entrepreneurial tendencies. Studies indicate that these women were very likely to have IQ
scores above the 80th percentile. According to Temin, this market operated efficiently and cleared based
on the quality rather than quantity of women in the labor pool. Schools could draw upon the best and
brightest of 50% of the American population without directly competing with industry STEM wages.
The figure below has been drawn from The Economics of Labor Markets by Kaufman and Hotchkiss
(Kaufman, et al., 2006). It was created to describe what happened to the teacher labor market in the
1970's. The book relates that in the late 1960's and early 1970's, a large influx of women entered college
because of the demographic hump created by the 'baby-boom' and an increased percentage of women
that went to college due to gender role liberalization. During this transition period many of these women
got degrees leading towards jobs in traditionally female dominated careers such as teaching. In the early
to mid seventies, the K-12 age group shrank as the baby-boomer presence in that demographic faded.
Suddenly, there was a glut of potential teachers without classrooms. Wages of teachers began to drop
relative to other jobs in the economy as a result. The number of new teachers began to fall, thus bringing
supply and demand back into balance. According to Temin, the result was that market for teachers began
to clear based on quantity rather than quality. While it was not stated in the text this figure was drawn
from, I believe that the relative teacher wage depression in the 1970's combined with newly available
STEM career paths for women, caused succeeding cohorts of new teachers to have dramatically lower
average quality.
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Figure 23: Teacher Supply and Demand and Relative Earnings
As shown previously in Figure 14, there was period from 1975 to 1985 in which a massive influx of
women earned Bachelor's degrees in engineering. Prior to this point, these STEM interested women may
have chosen to become science and math teachers, but the labor markets for STEM teachers and workers
were now becoming integrated. Many of these women would likely end up in industry for the first time.
Temin discusses at length the impact of this transition on how the system operates today (Temin, 2002):
We are not paying teachers enough to get high-quality applicants. The
result is that reforms have little effect because teachers are limited in
their effectiveness.
We are sub-optimizing with the current stock of teachers, rather like the
short-run adjustment of a firm with a fixed capital stock. Current reforms
of school administration and evaluation take the quality of teachers as
given; they simply rearrange the existing educational assets and have
little or no effects. Only when we break out of the current equilibrium of
pay and quality will education in the United States show a marked
improvement.
Low pay yields low quality. We traditionally ran our schools using a
trapped labor force, but we have liberated women in the past generation.
We have not been willing to pay enough to attract high quality teachers
in an open market.
We have substituted quantity for quality as the supply price of high-
quality female teachers rose. These interpretations are supported by
models with unique equilibria.
We rationalize the status quo...
We are at a local optimum, but far from the global optimum. The low
quality of current teachers has locked us into an equilibrium that is
inferior to one we might have reached with a different history. In other
words, we have not accommodated to the changing labor force
participation of women in the best way for education.
2.6.9.3 Teacher Incentive Structure
Beyond looking merely at the pay of teachers in the aggregate, it important to look at the incentive
structure determining the compensation of individual teachers and how it impacts teacher quality.
Unfortunately it appears that the incentive structures in the teaching profession are severely misaligned.
(Schacter, et al., 2004) Teacher pay has been found to correlate almost entirely with years of tenure,
hours of teacher training, and additional teacher education. While these metrics have almost no bearing on
outcomes, they are used almost exclusively in determining pay and career advancement. (Sander, 2008)
Other proxies for teacher quality such as the subjective opinion a principal has of the teacher's
performance, the undergraduate grades of the teacher, the selectivity of the teacher's undergraduate
institution, the teacher's scores on such tests as the SAT, ACT, or GRE, and the teacher's expertise in the
field they are teaching have no bearing on the teacher wages. (Southwick, et al., 1997) Earlier it was
noted in (Hanushek, et al., 2006) that teacher pay was not correlated with teacher quality. This is because
pay is not correlated (and in some cases is negatively correlated) with all teacher attributes that have
been found to significantly correlate with student outcomes.
However, those attributes which correlate with student outcomes also correlate highly with potential
industry pay. This simply indicates that those who tend to make the best teachers also tend to be very
good at other things as well. Because teachers are knowledge workers, and because knowledge workers
became much more valued in recent history, the correlations linking student outcomes and higher
potential industry pay became much stronger over the past fifty years. Simultaneously, union work rules
dramatically decreased the influence of those same factors in determining individual teacher wages. The
most capable teachers therefore experience the largest opportunity cost because they experience the
largest gap between their teaching salaries and their potential industry pay.
Also notable is the fact that teacher pay is not in any way correlated with subject area being taught.
STEM teachers are paid no better than history or art teachers. While teacher pay varied more widely in
the 1940's and tended to be set individually based on the discretion of principals and school boards, today
it is highly regulated by union rules according to a "uniform salary schedule" that attempts to be
"objective" and causes salary compression. (Southwick, et al., 1997)
Southwick and Indermit note that there has been a "decline in the quality of math and science teachers.
This ... is largely caused by the practice of paying teachers according to a salary schedule based only on
the number of credits beyond a Bachelor's degree and the number of years of teaching experience. This
"unified salary schedule" does not take into account the teacher's specialty; a mathematics or physics
teacher will be paid the same as an English or social studies teacher who has the same number of years of
schooling and years of experience." They go on to say that "while this system is not of recent vintage,
having been in place for most of this century, its effects are increasingly serious in an economy that is
becoming more technical. Between 1985 and 1991, the salaries of teachers rose by about 5.5% per
annum, while salaries in mathematically oriented professions (e.g. accounting, computer systems analysts,
engineers) rose by more than 6% per year, and salaries in verbally oriented professions (e.g. advertising,
copyreaders, editors) rose by about 4.5% per year. This implies that qualified teachers in mathematics and
sciences may be becoming increasingly more difficult to attract than are teachers in other subject areas."
Southwick and Indermit conclude that "If the trend continues, the U.S. will tend to become a nation which
can speak and write well but which increasingly has less to say and write about subjects which rely on
quantification." (Southwick, et al., 1997)
2.6.10Summary of Literature on Incentive Structure in Teaching Profession
The next chart distils the previous discussion by placing the relationships between teacher attributes and
their influence on teacher pay, their influence on STEM student outcomes, and their relationship with
potential pay available outside of teaching into a single chart. Green boxes indicate correlations, yellow
indicates a tenuous relationship, and clear indicates no or slightly negative correlations:
Correlation between various teacher attributes
and teacher pay, student outcomes and opportunity cost
STEM
Teacher Attribute Teacher pay Student
Outcomes
(Learning
Number of years in teaching
curve)
Additional teacher training
Masters degree in education
Subjective opinion of boss (principal)
Undergraduate GPA
Selectivity of undergraduate institution
SAT or ACT test scores
Subject matter area test scores
Expertise in STEM subject matter
Mobility (social and geographic)
Table 9: Correlation between Pay, Quality, Opportunity Cost, and Other Teacher Attributes
It should be no surprise that teacher attributes which are meaningful proxies for teacher quality including
undergraduate GPA, selectivity of the teacher's undergraduate institution, test scores, and subject matter
expertise in STEM have all declined dramatically in recent history. Teachers continue to be rewarded
based on metrics that have no correlation with student outcomes. Those proxies for teacher quality which
have a good deal of predictive power also have a high degree of correlation with potential industry pay,
and thus the opportunity cost an individual faces when choosing whether or not to enter the teaching
profession in the first place.
Two anecdotes illustrate artfully illustrate the dilemma we face:
In the spring of 2008 it was announced that four AP courses would be cut from the portfolio of
classes that allow advanced high-school students to earn college credit. These courses were
Italian, Latin Literature, French Literature and AB Computer Science. The decision to cut these
courses came about because few schools offered them. According to a Washington Post article
reporting on the issue, many school systems did not offer these courses because they wanted to be
"more focused on core subjects." (de Vise, 2008). While this is a plausible argument for the
three language courses listed, it seems ridiculous in the case of computer science. While some
may mourn the other three course offerings that were removed, I would argue that few high
school subjects have a more potential to teach skills valued in the global economy than computer
science. It is extremely doubtful that parents or children are uninterested in earning advanced
placement in that field. I suspect that the real reason this course was offered in so few schools is
because not many qualified teachers could be found to teach the material. The subject is ideally
taught by those with computer science, electrical engineering, or math training. Dr. Lenore
Blum, Professor of Computer Science at Carnegie Melon University, has said that in many
schools it is treated as a trade school subject and taught by people with business backgrounds or
no related background at all however.
* Marvin Minsky, a founder of the field of Artificial Intelligence, relayed a story to me about
something that happened in a Boston area school district in the 1980s. A large high-tech firm
decided to do a good deed for the local community by offering free summer-time training in
computer programming to the local math teachers so that they could bring this new knowledge
into the classroom. The result was that a large portion of those teachers found programming jobs
and quit. The schools were left without their math teachers. Teacher training that is effective at
improving teaching quality will also increase turnover ifpay is not increased to match.
2.7 Fourth Conceptual Model: Teacher Quality Loop
Based on the above discussion, the conceptual model will now be expanded to contain another feedback
loop that may allow the model to more accurately represent the real-world system.
2.7.1 Teaching Wages and Teacher Quality
Before describing the functioning of that new loop however, it will be best to first describe the
relationship between teacher wages, industry wages, and new STEM teacher quality in the model. This
mathematical relationship is depicted below:
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Figure 24: Function Defining Relationship between Teacher Wages and New Teacher Quality
The ratio of stem wages to industry wages is plotted on the X axis above. The point at X=1 is the point at
which teaching and industry jobs have equal utility. This lookup table resembles a 'sigmoid' function.
Quality is very sensitive to pay in the region where the two utilities are fairly equal. Quality is less
sensitive to pay if one job is significantly different from the other in terms of compensation. For example,
if the average computer scientist could earn $100,000 and a teaching job is worth $50,000 then this ratio
will be 0.5. Increasing the pay to $55,000 will increase the ratio to 0.55. Because 0.5 and 0.55 are in an
insensitive region of the graph, this change will not appreciably improve the quality of new entrants. On
the other hand, if the outside pay potential of history teachers is $50,000, the ratio for them will be 1. A
movement from 1 to 1.1 will cause new entrants to have higher quality because this shift occurs in a
steeper region on the graph. It is therefore probable that a small increase in teacher wages today will
positively impact the quality of new humanities teachers much more than new STEM teachers.
2.7.2 Teacher Quality Loop
Now that the relationship between pay and quality is understood, the entire teacher quality loop will be
described.
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Figure 25: Teacher Quality Conceptual Reinforcing Loop
If engineer wages rise and STEM teaching pay remains stagnant, then the widening wage gap between
industry and STEM teaching pay reduces the attractiveness of teaching jobs for people with strong STEM
skills. This reduction in attractiveness causes a reduction in the quality level of the average person
choosing STEM teaching as a profession. (The relationship between wages and quality was depicted in
the sigmoid above) This reduction in attractiveness causes a reduction in the quality level of the average
person choosing STEM teaching as a profession and will eventually negatively impact the statistical
distribution of teacher quality overall. A decline in average teacher quality will cause more students to
stop considering STEM careers, not because they are uninterested in them (as shown previously), but
because they believe themselves to be unqualified to continue. Most disturbingly, this eventually reduces
the number of engineers further, causes engineering wages to rise again, and ultimately further widens the
pay gap between STEM teacher and engineer. Were this the only causal loop in the model, engineering
wages would rise indefinitely, the number of engineers would be driven down to almost nothing, and
the quality of STEM teachers would be driven extremely low.
Unlike the balancing loop presented before, this is a positive or reinforcing feedback loop. Reinforcing
loops are responsible for rapid periods of change that can destabilize systems by creating exponential
growth or decay. Positive feedback loops are capable of moving in two directions. The one just
described is a vicious cycle. In the other, more virtuous direction, (if teaching quality were high enough
that enough STEM workers were being produced) teacher quality would continually grow, engineers
would proliferate, and engineering wages would be low. Neither of these extreme scenarios would occur
in reality because many other loops exist to limit the exponential growth or decay caused here. However,
the existence of this loop can serve to defeat reform that is too weak to 'tip' its behavior to operate in the
opposite, more virtuous direction.
2.7.3 Teacher Quality Determinants
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Figure 26: Teacher Quality Conceptual Reinforcing Loop with Quality Determinant Inputs
The figure above adds additional structure to test different historical scenarios. A transition governed by
variables related to gender related mobility is set to occur between the years 1975 and 1985. These years
were chosen somewhat arbitrarily because they correspond with the years of rapid growth of women
earning degrees in engineering (shown previously.) Prior to these years, the attractiveness of teaching
was determined by the pay of teachers relative to what women could earn in professions historically
accessible to them. Because these wages were less than engineering wages, teaching jobs would be seen
as relatively more attractive. By 1985, all potential teachers judge the attractiveness of STEM teaching
jobs relative to industry pay. Average STEM teacher pay is left as an exogenous variable so that it can be
manipulated during policy testing. Another concept introduced in this model is a variable representing
Number of
Engineering
Jobs
Hist
Student
Performance+
the level of correlation between individual teacher pay and student achievement. This variable
representing the impact of the incentive structure governing how individual teachers are rewarded impacts
the effectiveness of average salary increases on average teacher quality. A more positive correlation
between individual teacher pay and student achievement will positively affect both recruitment
effectiveness and the turnover rates of high-quality teachers.
2.8 Final Conceptual Model: Invisible Hand, STEM Gauntlet, and
Teacher Quality Combined
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Figure 27: Invisible Hand, STEM Gauntlet, Teacher Quality Conceptual Structure Combined
This model is now integrated into the full conceptual model that has been developed over the course of
the thesis. The 'invisible hand' and 'teacher quality' loops intersect at the point where a child either
continues in STEM education or falls out of the pipeline. As stated earlier, the model assumes that the
probability that a child continues on the STEM pipeline is a function of both ability and intent. After
years of delay, both the loops are influenced by the salaries earned by the professionals that made it
through the gauntlet whose behavior they both governed.
The final conceptual model that has been created is a synthesis of all the literature presented up until this
point. It is a combination of all previous pieces of structure that were built up incrementally. Model
conceptualization was a very valuable method for organizing knowledge about the static relationships
inherent in the system in a logical and consistent way. However, what is far from obvious at this point is
how this system will behave dynamically through time. At this point, human understanding must be set
aside because its limitations have been reached. While humans can build a model of theform of this
system its function can only be understood by handing control over to the computer. From here on out,
graphs of computer generated simulation runs will be presented to show how this largely self-contained
system evolves internally based only on the structure and relationships that have already been specified.
Some results will be straightforward. Others may be surprising.
This section ends with the story that the model tells: Employers have to compete with each other to get
scarce talent. They respond to mismatches in the supply of STEM workers by raising or lowering their
employment offers. If they can't find enough people, they are willing to pay more to get them. If there
are a lot of people on the market, they negotiate harder. It's impossible for these wages to rise too far
however because employers with STEM demands are only willing to pay so much before they become
unprofitable. If that becomes the case, they don't open as many job requisitions. Wages never fall far
quickly either because as the wages fall, employers open up new jobs as it becomes easier to be
profitable. The fluctuation in wages influences how attractive STEM careers are perceived to be by
society. Students in school and their parents respond to this perceived attractiveness by placing a higher
or lower value on STEM education. This influences their tendency to study and stay in courses that will
allow them to stay on track to eventually have a STEM career themselves. Meanwhile, these students are
not learning in a vacuum. They go to school every day and are influenced by the abilities and interests of
their teachers. Those who are lucky enough to have a succession of inspiring and knowledgeable STEM
teacher and who are also encouraged outside the classroom are more likely to continue through the
gauntlet because they perceive themselves to be good at it. Many more have a shaky handle on the
material, some because of variations in individual ability, but more because some previously uninspiring
or unknowledgeable teachers convinced them that STEM was either "boring" or "too hard." These
students become more likely to focus in other areas and neglect their math studies. In later years, some
are likely to say things like: "I'm just not good at math." Others will say things like "I'm more of an
artistic person. I like humanities." While this may be true for some, for others it will simply be after-the-
fact rationalization. They may use these rationalizations to drop down to easier math courses and only
take the minimum STEM requirements to graduate from high-school. Meanwhile, students graduate from
college every year to begin jobs in the workforce. Many have studied business, psychology, history,
English. Some of them go into the work world and get entry level jobs that may be interesting or may be
dead-end. They get paid around $30,000 or $45,000 to start. Some of these people choose to go into
teaching. Meanwhile, a few of their friends leave school with degrees in computer science or
engineering. These students are offered $65,000 or $75,000. Except for some saints who choose to enter
"Teach for America" for two years before beginning their "real career" three years later, most of these
students take lucrative offers and never look back. Not enough of these technically capable individuals
with real project experience and exposure to technology end up in the schools to populate all the STEM
classrooms. Some of the former history majors are pressed into teaching physics against their will
because they know algebra pretty well and got good grades in high school physics back in the day ....
This self contained world continues to spin through time as people become children, go to school, go to
college, enter the workforce, and retire. No one really knows what's in store 10, 20, or 50 years down the
road in this little world.
3 Simulating History and Projecting Forward
3.1 Assumptions and Initial Conditions
The notional model that was built up over Section 2 was actually built as a real software model that is
shown in the appendices. This model simulates inside a software package called Vensim. Vensim takes
model structure built by humans and projects forward in time to see what the behavior of the system will
look like tomorrow based on what it sees today. In this model for instance, the model was set to begin in
1940. All initial conditions were set so the state of the system in 1940 is perfectly known. The model
iteratively projects how the system will behave and builds up a picture over time to show how internal
forces and pressures cause the system to change. The most interesting behavior is that which is
endogenous or generated internally. Looking at graphs of simulation runs and seeing unexpected
interactions or unintended consequences can provide great insight into the functioning of the system.
Simulations were run with the following set of characteristics:
* Simulations run from the year 1940 until the year 2040.
* No population growth is represented in the model. Birth rates are assumed to be constant.
* Dollars are constant. There is no inflation.
* Average wages are constant for everyone except for engineers and STEM teachers.
* Students at every grade level respond equally to the economic outlook of STEM work. This
means, for instance, that if the current wages of engineers indicate that the pipeline exit fraction
should be 20%, then both 20% of second graders and 20% of high-school sophomores leave the
STEM pipeline during that year.
* Societal demand for STEM products and services are set to increase linearly between 1950 and
2040. This is intended to reflect the increasing importance of technology in our economic life.
* In some simulations women are liberated. They are allowed to enter the workforce starting with a
transition period that lasts from 1975 to 1985. In others, the labor market for STEM teachers and
STEM workers remain segregated.
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Figure 28: Societal Demand for STEM Work Increasing
3.2 Exogenous Non-linear Relationships
The conceptual model is complete with the exception that it inadequately describes the causal
relationships between some variables. While most relationships between variables in the model are
algebraic, five are specified using non-linear lookup tables in an attempt to make the system behave more
realistically.
Variable name conceptual from modelV iln eo tafm o
Figure 29: Engineering Attractiveness Function
Attractiveness of Engineering: This variable
determines the percentage of students who ' ._
continue studying STEM in a given year based on
the wages of STEM workers. A sigmoid-like
lookup function is used to describe this 8
relationship because increased pay will caused
increased student motivation up to a point, but
will then lead to diminishing returns.
Figure 30: Engineering Jobs Function
Number of Engineering Jobs: The number of W
jobs employers provide in the economy is a
downward sloping demand curve. The demand
for engineers is a function of their price. If wages .
go up, fewer jobs are available. If wages go
down, more jobs are created. The current
formulation is table that looks like a negative
exponential function.
Figure 31: Engineer Pay Function
Average Engineer Pay: The pay of engineers is
a function of the supply of engineers and the
number ofjobs currently available. This is
currently formulated as a lookup function that
looks like an upward sloping exponential
function. A shortage of engineers will cause
firms to bid up the price. A glut will cause wages
to stagnate or fall relative to other jobs in the
economy. I
Function determining value
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Figure 32: Student Performance Function
Student Performance: The fraction of students
to continue on the STEM pipeline in a given year
is a function of teacher quality. When quality is
low, quality increases will have a large impact.
This eventually leads to diminishing returns.
There is an upper limit on the percentage of
students that stay interested in STEM any year
because many will naturally be attracted to other
subjects.
Figure 33: New STEM Teacher Quality
Function
Quality of New STEM Teachers: The quality of
new STEM teachers is a function of the
opportunity cost associated with taking a teaching
career. The system is most responsive to pay
changes in regions where STEM industry and
STEM teacher pay is close to equal. It is
unresponsive at points that are much higher or
much lower. This relationship has been described
previously.
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3.3 Baseline Case: Women Never Enter the Workforce
This set of simulation runs first is intended to demonstrate what would happen if the labor pools of STEM
workers and STEM teachers had not been combined. Teacher quality continues to be quite high in these
runs because although teachers are not paid as well as STEM workers, their pay is higher than most other
jobs available to women. Because teacher quality remains high and constant, the only thing influencing
student retention in STEM subjects is STEM industry wages.
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Figure 34: Full Model Baseline Workers
The "Societal Demand for STEM Work" rises has been set to rise starting in 1950. This causes employers to attempt to create "STEM Positions"
to meet that demand. The number of "STEM Workers" also rise through time as more students graduate from college. Societal demand outpaces
the economy's ability to fill it to some extent because this demand is rising so rapidly and because of constraints in the educational system. The
system is behaving rationally and moving in the correct direction however.
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Figure 35: Full Model Baseline Wages
"STEM Wages" begin to rise in 1950 because employers facing shortages increase the amount they are willing to pay "STEM Workers." As some
societal demand continues to be unmet, STEM Wages continue to rise as employers bid up the cost of labor.
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Figure 36: Full Model Baseline STEM Students
Because wages rise, more students at all levels (elementary, junior high, high school, and college) continue on the STEM track, either because they
wish to maximize future economic return, or because social norms place increasing pressure to study STEM as a result of overall increased
interest. Notice that the rise in the number of students graduating from college occurs well after the rise in elementary school students begins.
This delay occurs because of the momentum in the system. Students are not allowed to reenter the pipeline after 1950 if they left it because of
wage levels prior to that point. The number of college graduates does not fully adjust to new market conditions until many years later because of
this constraint.
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Figure 37: Full Model Baseline Graduations
The number of college graduations from the previous graph is expanded in this one. Increasing demand beginning in 1950 causes more STEM
college graduates to emerge about 8 years later. The size of the workforce continues to grow as new entrants exceed retirements. A bubble
emerges because the delay in production created wages that were especially high immediately after the increase in demand started. After it began
to be filled, wages came down slightly before continuing on a steady rise. As new graduations continue to outpace retirements, the size of the
STEM workforce grows.
The previous system showed a reasonable, although constrained, response to increasing demand. The
only structure active in this system was the STEM Gauntlet and the Supply & Demand loops. This is a
very simple picture of the market operating to fix the problem.
One other thing to notice is about this simulation is the incredible constraints and delays built into the
system. It takes ten years before the increase in market demand before any difference in college
graduations into the STEM workforce occurs. The number of available jobs and workers never is able to
fully catch up to the rapidly increasing societal demand for STEM goods and services.
3.4 Historical: Labor Markets Merge
This next model run is intended to depict a crude representation of what actually happened in the real-
world system, and what will happen in the future if the current set of policies is maintained.
The following settings are in effect for this simulation:
* Liberalization of gender roles occurs and female STEM graduates are allowed to choose freely
between teaching and industry professions after a transition period that happens over the course of
1975 to 1985.
* Pay of teachers remains constant over time. This pay is very good compared to jobs historically
available to women, but much less than STEM workers make in industry.
Figure 38: Full Model Historical Teacher Wages
This value of "Teaching wages" is high relative to "Historical
Womens Wages", but low compared to "STEM Wages".
While STEM teacher pay remains flat, the wages that
potential teachers compare against when choosing
professions ("STEM Comparison Wages") rise significantly.
Prior to 1975 teaching is seen as highly attractive. During
1975 to 1985, women in STEM move into industry. During
this transition period wage expectations grow. After 1985,
STEM teacher wages are judged directly against the wages
that women can earn in industry science and engineering
jobs.
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Figure 39: Full Model Baseline Teacher Wage Ratio
Because the opportunities available to women changed
dramatically over the course of the simulation, the ratio of
teacher wages to wages available elsewhere for women in
STEM shrink dramatically. While female teachers are paid a
premium relative to what they could get elsewhere
previously, after 1985 they take a substantial penalty for
choosing STEM teaching over industry work. This ratio
continues to shrink further as STEM wages grow from 1985
onward.
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Figure 40: Full Model Historical Teacher Quality
Because teachers are paid a premium prior to 1975 and mobility was restricted, schools are able to draw from the best and brightest of fifty percent
of the population. As other more lucrative opportunities open up however, the "Average Quality of New STEM Educated Teachers" drops. Over
time, this causes a decline in the "Average Quality of STEM Educated Teachers" as new entrants come in and more senior teachers retire.
Fractional Teacher Attrition Rate
Figure 41: Full Model Historical Teacher Attrition
Because the teachers with very high quality have more lucrative
opportunities open to them between 1975 and 1985, the "Fractional
Teacher Attrition Rate" grows. As the quality of teachers drops, the
opportunities available outside teaching for the average teacher also
drop, causing attrition to slow again.
Figure 42: Full Model Historical Teacher Quantity
In addition to a quality decline in the average STEM educated
teacher, a shortage of those teachers emerges. The "Pecentage of
Classrooms Taught by STEM Educated Teachers" drops. An
increasing percentage of STEM classrooms must be taught by people
untrained in STEM subjects.
I
Thnime (Year)
Percentage Classrooms Taught By STEM Educated Teachers
2 1 1
0.5
0
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040
Time (Year)
STEM Classroom Quality
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Time (Year)
Average Quality of STEM Educated Teachers : Historical0 1
Average STEM Teacher Quality :Historical0 2 2-
Quality of Unqualified Teachers : Historical0 - -
2010 2020 2030 2040
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I
! ! - L
Figure 43: Full Model Historical Classroom Quality
The quality of the average classroom is influenced by two things. The first is the "Average Quality of STEM Educated Teachers." The second
determined by the fraction of classrooms taught by teachers with STEM training. Therefore, because of teacher shortages "Average STEM
Teacher Quality" ends up much lower than "Average Quality of STEM Educated Teacher." It is "Average STEM Teacher Quality" that students
experience in the classroom.
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Figure 44: Full Model Historical Student Behavior
The fraction of students able to continue STEM drops as a result of the decrease in STEM classroom quality. More wish to continue on the
pipeline as a result of increasing economic opportunity. The combined result of these two impacts make the "Fraction That Continue STEM" drop
even though more students "Wish to Coninue." The combination of this increase in student desire, but decrease in quality education causes a
decline in the number of students continuing on the pipeline at all levels. The peak of overall student ability to continue occurs in the mid-to-late
1970's.
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Figure 45: Full Model Historical STEM Students
As a result of a decline in the overall ability to continue, the number of students in the pipeline at all levels begins to drop after delays. Peaks in
the number of students continuing on the pipeline at different grade levels occur at different times because of inertia in the system.
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Figure 46: Full Model Historical Graduation
400,000
College graduations of STEM students (now shown to full scale)
peak in the year 1986 and then drop significantly thereafter in this
scenario. This graph qualitatively mimics the actual behavior 300,000
shown in the real system. One thing to observe is that the number
of graduations continues to fall through time with no increase in
sight under this set of conditions. The fall trails off however 200,000
because the system settles into a poor operating region of model
behavior.
100,000
0
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040
Time (Year)
Figure 47: Full Model Historical Entering Workforce 
STEM Graduates Entering Workforce
400,000
Prior to gender related mobility "New STEM Teacher Hiring"
remained flat because hires were able to match retirements. After
gender related mobility however, increased turnover opened up 300,000
many more positions. Many of the STEM graduates during In the
1980's go into teaching to fill the demand left, but STEM teacher 200,000
supply is unable to keep up with demand. These levels could not 200,000
be sustained after the 1986 peak in STEM graduates because not
enough STEM workers are available to either industry or to the 100,000
schools. At this point the few remaining STEM workers tend to
choose industry jobs because of substantially higher pay.
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Figure 48: Full Model Historical Teacher Shortage
600,000
The number of STEM graduates going into teaching cannot keep
pace with the "Desired Teacher Hires" so the shortfall of STEM 450,000
qualified teachers continues to get worse.
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Figure 49: Full Model Historical Teacher Quantity STEM Teacher Quantity
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As a result of the "Qualified STEM Teacher Shortfall", classrooms
are taught by teachers without STEM credentials. Sadly, the demand 600,000
for STEM teachers actually drops somewhat over time because
fewer students take high-level math and science courses because 0
more have already fallen off the pipeline in earlier years. By 2008 400,000
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Figure 50: Full Model Historical STEM Workers
Because fewer students make it through the STEM pipeline, fewer become "STEM Workers". As a direct result, the number of STEM workers in
the economy begins to drop after 2000 despite increasing demand for the output of STEM work. The number of jobs open in the economy
continues to fall as well because STEM workers are only willing to work in increasingly high-pay capacities.
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Figure 51: Full Model Historical Wages Diverge
As a result of a decrease in the number of STEM college graduates and STEM workers, wages begin a dramatic rise in 1995 because industry bids
up the price of scarce skills. The gap between teacher pay and industry pay widens further causing the quality of STEM education to further
decline. This perverse nature of this positive feedback relationship causes the number of graduates in STEM fields to decline at the same time that
STEM wages rise. The long-term impact of teacher pay constraints make rational short-term "invisible hand" responses of industry lead to
perverse outcomes over the course of generations.
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3.5 Insights from Historical Simulation and Future Projection
The model presented here is capable of producing behavior in which high pay in STEM fields directly
causes future long-term labor shortages in those same fields. The dangerous loop we explored could be
influential in any situation in which teachers earn less than practitioners and there is a scarcity of
practitioners. The system might systematically under-produce exactly what the economy needs most in
the long run. This would be especially pronounced in fields requiring knowledge with strong vertical
dependencies (and therefore long lead-times and high-barriers to re-entry) such as mathematics. The
system is perfectly rational in the short term - industry bids up the price of more valuable skills and draws
people out of other places - including teaching. This economic signaling mechanism increases the short-
term availability of practitioners, but could destroy the long term production capability for those skills,
creating chronic shortages that are self perpetuating after decades of delay.
Another notable feature in the model is the incredible inertia in the system. The impact of merging the
labor force for STEM teachers and STEM workers took decades to play out. For instance:
* Women start to move into the workforce in 1975
* College STEM graduations peak in 1986
* STEM teacher shortages begin in 1987
* STEM wages begin to rise noticeably around 1995
* The number of STEM workers in the economy peaks around 2000
* Then the U.S. STEM industry then begins a downward spiral
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The original problem statement asked why the number of engineers peaked in 1985 and then declined
thereafter. This simulation has been able to successfully reproduce a peak in the number of graduating at
the same time that wages stay strong or even grow. The simulation predicts that wages will continue
growing relative to other jobs in the economy and that the size of the U.S. STEM capable workforce will
continue to decline.
While 1985 may have been somewhat significant in the short-term because it represented a 'tech bust'
that occurred at that time, it is doubtful that the results of that bust would continue through today. What
is more likely is that events in 1985 had no real significance in causing the long dramatic drop. Rather,
increased demand for engineers during the early years of the Cold War, teacher unionization in the
1960's, and the liberalization of gender roles in the 1970's all helped to strengthen the power of the
reinforcing loop and tip it in a negative direction. The impact these events had on engineering
graduations would not be felt until decades later.
4 Simulating Alternative Futures
In addition to helping us understand both history and our current future, another use of a historical
simulation is to generate a baseline from which alternative policies going forward can be tested. Even if
the baseline values are not calibrated perfectly, the behavior of system response to policy changes relative
to the historical run can give insight into which reforms will have the most impact. A number of
simulations are presented in this section that assume 'historical' behavior until the year 2008 and switch
to some other policy to test the impact of that reform.
4.1 Fixed Wage Increase of 10 Percent
The first policy tested is an across the board increase in STEM teacher wages of 10 percent. It should be
noted that because simulations are in constant dollars, this persistent ten percent increase is in addition to
a yearly inflation adjustment. If inflation is 3 percent then this simulation represents a 13 percent increase
followed by three percent increases thereafter.
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Figure 52: Policy Test Fixed Increase Teacher Wages
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Figure 53: Policy Test Fixed Increase New Teacher Quality
While a ten percent increase seems fairly large to policymakers, it makes minimal impact on the ratio of STEM teacher wages to STEM industry
wages because these wages are so far apart. Quality rises a little bit, but then continues to drop as STEM industry wages continue to rise.
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Figure 54: Policy Test Fixed Increase Teacher Attrition
While the impact of the wage increase has minimal impact on new teacher quality, it decreases attrition because teachers at the current average
quality level are paid more than they expected to get when entering the profession. This decrease in attrition means that fewer of the new teachers
with slightly higher quality are actually hired because there are fewer slots to fill.
Percentage Classrooms Taught By Qualified Teachers
1.2
0.9
0.6
0.3
0
1940
Percentage Classro
Percentage Classro
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Time (Ye,
oms Taught By STEM Educated Teachers : HistoricalO
oms Taught By STEM Educated Teachers : TenPercent
2010 2020 2030 2040
1 1 -;I
'7 '7\
Figure 55: Policy Test Fixed Increase Teacher Quantity
An insignificant increase in the percentage of classrooms taught by STEM trained teachers occurs.
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Figure 56: Policy Test Fixed Increase Teacher Quality
An insignificant increase in overall classroom quality occurs.
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Figure 57: Policy Test Fixed Increase College Graduations
This reform fails to impact American capabilities in STEM.
4.2 Different Fixed Wage Increases
If a ten percent wage increase will have no impact on the system, other fixed wage increases amounts
above ten percent still may. In this section a variety of fixed wage increases are tested.
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Figure 58: Policy Test Multiple Fixed Increases
Wage level in the historical scenario was set at 0.7. Other values tested after 2008 now include 0.9, 1.1,
1.3, and 1.5. In the historical scenario, STEM industry wages had grown to slightly above 1.0 by 2008 in
the historical scenario. Therefore, most wage increases tested here make teacher wages rise above those
of STEM workers today.
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Figure 59: Multiple Fixed Increases STEM Wages
"STEM Wages" continue to rise in response to the growing shortage until 2025. In fact, they rise faster than the historical case because more
STEM workers are in teaching rather than industry. In 2025, "STEM Wages" exhibit what is called "tipping point." Low wage increases have
virtually no impact while larger wage increases cause enormous impact by reversing the downward spiral, thus causing a fundamental change in
the dynamic behavior of the system. Fixed teacher wages increases can be made high enough to cause positive feedback loop to 'tip' into a more
virtuous behavior.
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Figure 60: Multiple Fixed Increases Teacher Quality
The average quality of new teachers rises significantly in response to the wage increase. As STEM industry wages continue to rise however, the
quality again begins to fall. Under some scenarios (when wages in STEM industry drop twenty years later) quality begins to rise again in 2028.
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Figure 61: Multiple Fixed Increases Teacher Attrition
Because the current set of teachers receive an unexpected windfall created by the sudden increase in wages, their attrition rate slows significantly.
This decreases the number of new entrants that are allowed into the classroom, thus slowing quality improvement of the average teacher.
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Figure 62: Multiple Fixed Increases Teacher Quantity
Although a much higher percentage of STEM graduates choose to enter teaching, there is still a shortage of STEM qualified teachers for many
years because there is a shortage of STEM graduates available to both industry and to schools that is persistent. This is because even though a
majority of graduates choose teaching under some scenarios here, there still are not enough of them to satisfy the teacher shortfall. Under the
higher wage scenarios, eventually the shortages are abated because enough STEM college graduates are eventually created to fill both school and
industry demand. This graph also is indicative of tipping point behavior in the system.
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Figure 63: Multiple Fixed Increases Classroom Quality
Average STEM teacher quality is a function of both the quality of STEM trained teachers and the percentage of STEM classrooms taught by
qualified teachers. Under lower wage increase levels, quality improves marginally but then continues to decline. Under high wage scenarios
quality rises substantially and then continues to climb because the systemic forces are moving in more positive directions.
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Figure 64: Multiple Fixed Increases College Graduation
The number of college graduates who emerge after the reform in 2008 begins to change dramatically after the year 2013 under some scenarios.
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Figure 65: Multiple Fixed Increases STEM Workers
Higher teacher wage increases in 2008 cause STEM industry output to radically change in the year 2028. Note that in this graph STEM workers
fill a social demand for STEM work. A larger gap either means that societal demands go unfilled or that these demands are fulfilled by
outsourcing technical work to other countries or importing technology. The size of the gap has significant implications for the U.S. balance of
trade.
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4.3 Competitive Wages
While large fixed teacher wage increases have enormous impacts on the system, it would be good to study
a policy that is potentially more stable. The next test examines what would happen if teacher wages are
increased to be equal to STEM industry wages. STEM teacher wages respond dynamically to changes in
industry pay.
In this graph, teacher wages are shown to be higher than STEM industry pay because of a modifier related
to 'intrinsic teacher reward.' Monetary compensation is equal, but it is believed that people derive some
utility from doing a social good and other lifestyle considerations. This utility is here translated into a
dollar value and added to wages here.
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Figure 66: Policy Test Competitive Wage
Teacher compensation steps from current levels to values much higher in 2008. They
until approximately 2040 while shortages of STEM trained individuals get worse.
continue to rise
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Figure 67: Competitive Wage Teacher Quantity
The percentage of classrooms taught by people with training in STEM subjects rises. In the year 2035, teacher shortages end, and every classroom
is taught by a STEM qualified individual.
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Figure 68: Competitive Wage Classroom Quality
The quality of the average STEM teacher also begins to rise asymptotically towards a stable level associated with the quality of new entrants that
can be drawn by paying wages equal to industry wages. Classroom quality rises to equal the quality level of STEM capable teachers as shortages
abate.
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Figure 69: Competitive Wage Student Behavior
The quality improvement in 2008 causes the downward trend of STEM college graduates to reverse in 2016. After that point, the number of
STEM trained college graduates begins a rapid ascent.
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Figure 70: Competitive Wage STEM Workers
While college graduations begin to rise in the year 2016, it is only in 2030 that the number of graduates becomes equal to the 
number of
retirements, causing the number of STEM workers in industry to begin to rise again. It is not until 2040 that industry begins to close the gap
between societal demand and industrial output.
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4.4 STEM Teacher Wages as a Fixed Percentage of STEM Industry
Wages
Tying STEM teacher pay to industry pay made the system more responsive and stable than fixed wage
increases that are unrelated to industry pay. The following set of simulations tests various teacher wage
policies that fix teacher wages to some percentage of industry pay, but not necessarily equal to industry
pay. Pay levels that are tested are wages at 50%, 75%, 100%, 125%, and 150% of STEM industry pay.
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Figure 71: Policy Test Multiple Floating Wages
Higher wage ratios increase the number of qualified STEM educated teachers faster. System response to
this policy also exhibits tipping point behavior.
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Figure 72: Floating Wages Teacher Quantity
This reduces the number of classes taught by teachers unqualified in STEM. Some ratios are high enough only to arrest the decline, while others
eventually cause total recovery.
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Figure 73: Floating Wages Teacher Quality
In addition to quantity increases, quality increases also occur. These quality increases now are stable over time because it is the opportunity costs
rather than the wages of teachers are fixed.
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Figure 74: Floating Wages Teacher Attrition
Increased wage ratios cause attrition rate to decline more because the current stock of teachers receive an unexpected windfall and stay longer as 
a
result. This reduces the rate that new teachers can be hired because fewer openings exist.
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Figure 75: Floating Wages Student Behavior
Higher quality teachers cause the number of people remaining in the pipeline to increase. For some scenarios, this number eventually goes down
between 2020 and 2030 because teacher quality is no longer a bottleneck in the system. At this point, the system has "tipped." These students
become less interested at the point because STEM wages go down, not because teacher quality is in decline. The invisible hand of the market
rather than the nefarious teacher quality loop is now regulating the societal production of STEM workers.
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Figure 76: Floating Wages College Graduation
Higher STEM teacher wage ratio increases cause the number of college graduates entering the STEM workforce to increase dramatically after the
year 2016.
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Figure 77: Floating Wages STEM Workers
This policy change in 2008 eventually causes the number of STEM workers in the economy to begin a noticeable recovery in the year 2028.
Notice that in the best scenarios industry shortages actually are worse between 2010 and 2025 because many more of these workers are in the
teaching workforce rather than in industry.
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4.5 Individual Teacher Pay and Individual Teacher Quality
Correlated
Previous simulated policies involved increasing teacher pay substantially and then waiting for positive
outcomes that only occurred after a generation. Other less costly policies should also be explored. It was
noticed in previous simulations that teacher attrition increased as wages declined and high-quality
teachers with higher opportunity costs left for better compensation elsewhere. Teacher attrition slowed as
wages rose because teachers with wage expectations that were suddenly exceeded stayed longer. As a
result, teacher quality fell much faster than it was able to rise. The next policy test attempts to simulate
the effect of correlating teacher pay with teacher quality. In addition, teacher pay is set equal to STEM
industry pay. The purpose is to begin to build understanding of what would occur if teacher wage
increases are disproportionately aimed at teachers of high quality. Attrition of low quality teachers will
not be decreased, while attrition rates of high quality teachers will be slowed.
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Figure 78: Policy Test Pay Correlated
This policy is tested by fixing teacher attrition at the constant rate it was equal to immediately before the
policy change in 2008 rather than allowing it to fluctuate over time. While this simulation is not a totally
adequate representation of a policy of paying individuals differently based on their quality as teachers, it
is informative. If anything, this test dramatically understates the impact of paying individuals based on
the quality of their teaching and their students' outcomes.
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Figure 79: Pay Correlated Teacher Quality
Because new high-quality teachers can enter the system faster, average teacher quality recovers faster. While it is not shown in this model, they
will also stay longer relative to lower quality teachers, than they would if wages are totally uncorrelated with the quality of individual teachers.
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Figure 80: Pay Correlated College Graduations
The number of STEM college graduates goes up faster as a result.
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Figure 81: Pay Correlated STEM Workers
Finally, the number of workers recovers more strongly.
One very important feature to notice about all successful reforms shown so far is that the number of STEM workers in the economy gets worse
before better. These people that are not in the economy raising productivity and U.S. GDP are instead busy as teachers. After fifteen years, the
fruits of their labor pay off in a qualitative change in the output of new STEM workers.
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4.6 Insights from Policy Simulations
Policies to increase teacher pay by a small amount had virtually no impact in the simulations. Large
teacher increases on the other hand were able to move the system past a "tipping point" causing it to
operate in a fundamentally different way. In the current state, the number of STEM graduates is largely
controlled by the "teacher quality loop" rather than the invisible hand of the market. This means that the
market is not responding "rationally" to the wage signaling mechanism. A threshold must be passed so
that the structure regulating college outflow is actually more sensitive to market demand rather than
teacher quality. Such a transition would take considerable investment in education, and the benefits
would not be fully felt for many years because of a transition period in which higher quality teachers
would slowly enter schools and an entire generation of more STEM capable children would be grown.
Teacher pay is the current constraint causing less than desirable STEM industry productivity, while
STEM industry wages are the current constraint on teacher quality. In order to break this negative cycle,
teachers have to be of high enough quality that they can eventually produce enough STEM graduates to
meet domestic retirements, meet business growth demands, and to fully populate the educational system.
A tipping point must be crossed so that these gaps begin to close rather than widen further. If teacher pay
is high enough to draw a substantial number of quality people out of industry in the short term, then in the
longer term the educational system will start to eventually fill this gap. If the system begins to "tip" in a
more positive direction, it will mean that the positive feedback loop in the system is spinning in the
opposite, more beneficial direction. Teacher quality will be high enough that many more STEM
graduates are produced every year. Although industry and schools still split this pool of graduates, there
would be many more people to split. If the raw number of STEM qualified individuals going into
teaching rises as a result of this feedback then the system will be reinforcing in the opposite direction.
The positive loop will begin to look like a "teachers creating teachers" loop. High quality teachers will
produce many graduates, eventually expanding the pool of qualified teachers, thus increasing the quality
of teachers, further increasing the number of graduates.
If teacher wages do not raise enough to cross the "tipping point," then the system may appear to get better
in the short term, but ultimately progress will peter out and fail to positively impact size of the U.S.
STEM labor force.
The other significant feature displayed prominently in these simulations is the incredible amount of inertia
in the system. While the presence of a tipping point means that investments today can have enormous
impact on the future of the U.S. economy, these investments may not come to fruition for decades. It
took a considerable amount of neglect for a long period of time to get us into the current mess. It will
take a long time to get out of it.
For example, after the policy changes in 2008:
* College STEM graduations began to rise in 2013
* At the earliest, STEM teacher shortages were erased by 2025
* The number of STEM workers in the economy began to rise between 2025 and 2035
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Finally, there are other non-monetary reforms that can help speed up the delays that will weigh down the
impacts wage increases can have on classroom quality. Paying teachers a fair market rate for the skill
they have should make them more tolerant of other contractual changes that allow compensation and job
security to be tied to performance. Ultimately, teachers must be treated, respected, compensated, and
evaluated like professionals again.
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5 Final Insights and Conclusions: America
Disrupted?
This goal of this work was to uncover a cause for the decline in the number of engineering graduates that
has taken place since 1985 despite the fact that engineering wages have remained incredibly strong and
engineering unemployment was extremely low during that time period. This presented a paradox that was
hard to understand. It seemed that the law of labor-market supply & demand was being violated in some
fundamental sense. By going through a system dynamics modeling process, I was able to devise a
plausible model that is capable of reproducing historical system behavior in a qualitative sense. I
identified a positive feedback loop that can cause normal market mechanisms to turn against themselves
leading to market failure.
The process of building and simulating the model moved research in many originally unintended
directions leading to insights including the following:
* The STEM educational system is structured as a "gauntlet." The unique hierarchical or
sequentially structured nature of mathematics knowledge leads to a situation in which students
that fail to keep up will most likely never end up as scientists or engineers. Efforts at educational
reform in STEM should therefore focus on putting in place an intact continuous pipeline of
quality math educators throughout K-12. Unlike humanities subjects, the impact of a lone
inspirational mathematics teacher can only be minimal. Low quality at any one point in the
pipeline may invalidate the effectiveness of good teachers at every other point in the chain.
* The length of this pipeline leads to considerable delays when responding to economic signals.
The decision to pursue a Law degree can be made during college, but failing to keep pace in
elementary school mathematics can forever exclude a person form a STEM career. Over 80
percent of people have been effectively excluded from engineering before entering high-school.
* Although the market for STEM workers generally functions as a "free-market," the extremely
high barriers to entry caused by the constraints imposed by the "gauntlet" and by poor teacher
quality are effective at keeping wages extremely high. Many of these barriers are caused by
inequality of educational opportunity. Those children who are not in a school with an intact
pipeline of quality STEM educators are much more likely to fail. These children are effectively
excluded from a chance at social mobility. Because our society embraces a system of economic
justice predicated upon the notion of "equality of opportunity" rather than "equality of
outcomes," these results should give us pause. Effectively excluding racial minorities and the
economically disadvantaged from STEM careers by failing to provide an intact STEM pipeline in
elementary school can be viewed as a civil rights issue.
* By paying teacher wages that have no relation to subject matter, we impose the highest
opportunity costs on bright individuals in high-paying fields. The educational system is therefore
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systematically set up to produce the poorest proficiency in skills the economy deems most
desirable.
* The drop-off in the number of engineering graduates that began in 1985 had nothing to do with
the year 1985 itself. It happened because the damaging "teacher quality" loop was activated and
strengthened by three things that occurred in the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's. Firstly, the Cold
War increased the demand for STEM skills, raising the wages of STEM workers and the number
of STEM workers the economy desired. Secondly, gender role liberalization combined with
declining teacher pay and status caused teacher quality to plummet. Finally, unionization erased
any correlation between teacher pay and student outcomes. These three impacts all contributed to
setting the devastating feedback loop explored here in motion.
* The architectural relationships between the American systems of government, K-12 education,
academia, and industry are set up to systematically under-develop the quantitative and analytical
skills that the economy desires most. We are trapped by a positive feedback loop that is operating
in a nefarious manner. Higher industry wages result in lower quality educators in the short term,
and lower quality educators cause higher industry wages in the long term.
* The positive feedback loop in which we are currently trapped can be induced to operate in an
opposite, more beneficial manner. In order to cause this qualitative shift in system behavior
however, investment in reform must be sufficient to move us past a "tipping point." If investment
in education is sufficiently strong, it may create more STEM college graduates. If many more
STEM College graduates are produced, then more of them will choose to go into teaching. If
reducing shortages raises quality, and raising quality reduces shortages, then the same loop will
be operating in a direction that is highly beneficial for our schools, domestic technology-based
industries, and U.S. economic health.
In order for STEM teachers to be drawn from the 'best and the brightest' today they must be paid
accordingly. Because previous generations both invested more in education and could rely on a trapped
labor pool, they provided their children with excellent educations. The 'baby-boomer' cohort was the last
generation to receive this substantial gift from its parents. Spending the money to return high-quality
educators to our schools is perhaps the most efficient investment our society could make in its long term
economic health. This is not a mere platitude - the reinforcing causal mechanism shown in this paper can
dramatically impact the dynamics of the system - both for better and for worse. However, this would
require sustained effort and willpower. At times things could appear to get worse in the short-term before
they get better. The existence of a tipping point in the system implies that small incremental fixes to the
system could have no lasting impact. Effects may only be felt if both wage levels and incentive policies
are both altered dramatically and sustained for multiple decades. The wounds we are now experiencing
were inflicted over many years and cannot be healed overnight.
One final question that must be asked is: "could America be disrupted?" The combination of poor student
performance, increasing math illiteracy at a societal level, high STEM salaries, and STEM labor shortages
will necessarily lead to increased outsourcing and a worsening balance of trade. The societal demand for
the output of STEM labor will not simply go unmet. If the STEM labor force situation gets bad enough,
there are plausible scenarios in which the U.S. could be transformed from an economic powerhouse into a
cottage industry simply because our society was incapable of thinking beyond the next fiscal year or
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election cycle. If this happens, we are likely to seek out scapegoats. Unfortunately, blaming foreign
competition for our own failings in this regard is as tempting politically as it is useless. If we fail to
remain globally competitive in high-tech it will be because we destroyed ourselves. The problems we
now face were entirely self-made.
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Appendix A: Potential Areas for Future Modeling
This model can be expanded in many useful ways. The following is a partial list of feasible extensions:
* A more detailed structure for understanding the relationship between teacher quality and teacher
turnover should be built.
* The impact of foreign workers in U.S., foreign students in U.S. institutions of high education,
outsourcing, and foreign competition should be included. Currently in the model it is possible for
STEM wages to rise to levels that would not truly be practical. Higher STEM wages should
trigger increased outsourcing and strengthening foreign competition.
* Gender related issues could be explored in the model. Male and female STEM track students
could be split into two separate structures and the rate of advance or 'falling out of the pipeline'
can be treated separately by gender. The concepts of sex differences in 'self-efficacy' and
planned behavior can be explored within the context of the model. Similar work could be done to
look at issues of race and ethnicity.
* Behavior in the pipeline can be expanded to include other things impacting perceived behavioral
control, social norms and individual preferences. Some things to look at could include socio-
economic status and the importance of role-models.
* Currently the model does not represent variation by geography or desirability of a school or
school district to teachers. Geography based dynamics could be introduced to study the impact of
teacher turnover based on the desirability of living in different locales.
* Quality should be modeled separately at different grade levels based on the characteristics of
effective STEM teachers at those different levels.
* Quality and attrition at the university level should be incorporated. The conflicting demands of
teaching and conducting research should be considered.
* Dr. Stuart Rojstaczer, formerly at Duke University, provided the following information: In the
1960's the typical university student studied 26 hours outside the classroom. Today the same
student studies for 12 hours. Meanwhile, the average GPA has gone up substantially. In
addition, humanities majors have a GPA that is 0.4 higher than the typical engineering student.
Create a model that incorporates the dynamics causing an upward shift in GPA known as grade
inflation. Does this cause the decreased hours of study? Do higher GPAs and less hours of work
translate into exodus from engineering at the university level?
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Appendix B: Kondratieff Long Wave?
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Figure 82: Long Wave Positions
Graph for STEM Workers
2006 2072 2138 2204 2270 2336 2402 2468 2534 2600
Time (Year)
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Figure 83: Long Wave Wages
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Figure 85: Long Wave Graduations
One feature of the dynamic behavior of the model that was unexpected is that the model produces
consistent oscillations with a periodicity of approximately 50 years under some circumstances. This may
be significant because many economists have put considerable effort into to documenting and explaining
the existence of economic "long waves" with approximately the same periodicity. The existence of such
waves was first posited by Kondratieff (Kondratieff, 1935), and the idea was brought back in more recent
history by Schumpeter (Schumpeter, 1939), who popularized the idea of "creative destruction."
(Schumpeter, 1942) They have been studied extensively by Freeman (Freeman, et al., 2002), Perez
(Perez, 2002), and Sterman (Sterman, 1985) among others. Many studying the issue assert that periods of
radical technological innovation in industrialized capitalist economies tend to recur approximately every
fifty to sixty years. Many of the current explanations for the wave attempt to tie it to the functioning of
financial markets, the availability of capital, the rate at which society is capable of absorbing and
diffusing technological change, and the reaction of the political system to periods of "irrational
exuberance" and the ensuing "busts."
When simulating a model containing only the "STEM Gauntlet" and "Invisible Hand Loops" structure
depicted in Figure 18 and Figure 20 for over six hundred years, the following pictures emerged. While
these oscillations did not occur under all sets of initial conditions and parameters, most models resonated
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with at similar frequencies even if their oscillations happened to dampen rather than continuing forever as
depicted here. In these runs, all exogenous parameters used to influence the model remained constant
over time. This behavior is internally generated by the structure of the system.
Students in the STEM pipeline at all ages (K-12 and university) either continue to study mathematics or
fall off based on the current wages of STEM workers that are observed while they are in school. After a
considerable delay, these students emerge to become STEM workers. As discussed previously, students
who fall off the pipeline at any stage are not allowed to reenter it even if later market conditions improve.
The wages of STEM workers climb if this demand is not met by current labor force levels and fall if there
is an excess of workers. The number of available jobs increases if STEM workers are cheaper and
decrease as wages rise. In this sense, the market "clears." Technical jobs and workers try to match at a
prevailing wage. If there is a mismatch, wages (rather than workers) tend to adjust because the supply of
workers can only be influenced by the extremely long-term functioning of the STEM pipeline. STEM
employers cannot use substitutes from the pool of non-STEM capable workers in this model.
The oscillations presented here have a periodicity of approximately fifty years. The length of this wave is
highly sensitive to length of the educational pipeline. The time it takes to educate someone before they
can become a productive STEM worker is set to be around 17 years in the model. These oscillations
produce generational spurts in interest in STEM that are followed by periods of ambivalence when the
market for STEM labor becomes saturated with more senior workers.
Here I present a hypothesis for the technological long wave which I believe to be novel. I propose that
neither financial markets nor political systems create innovation. Technologists create innovation.
Capital chases that innovation. The attractiveness of STEM work at any time influences both the quality
and quantity of people emerging from educational institutions many years later. The quality and quantity
of employed STEM workers at any point in time determines the rate of technological change that is
possible. The periodicity of the technological long wave is largely influenced by the length of time it
takes to train a child to effectively contribute in STEM fields and the limitations imposed by the
sequential and hierarchical nature of mathematical knowledge itself.
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Appendix C: Simulation Model Structure
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Appendix D: Model Equatior
Becoming Children[gender]=
birthing/2
Units: student/Year
Birth Rate=
IF THEN ELSE(Switch for Birth Rate
Type, Variable Birth Rate, Constant Birth Rate
Units: person/Year
birthing=
Birth Rate
Units: person/Year
College Fraction That Continue STEM[gender]=
0.5
Units: 1
College Fraction That Do Not Continue
STEM[gender]=
1-College Fraction That Continue
STEM[gender]
Units: 1
Combined STEM College Outflow=
SUM(STEM College Outflow[gender!])
Units: people/Year
Constant Birth Rate=
IV Population*Fractional Death Rate
Units: person/Year
Duration College=
4
Units: Year
Duration Elementary=
6
Units: Year
Duration HS=
4
Units: Year
Duration JH=
3
Units: Year
Duration Pre School=
5
Units: Year
dying=
Population/Life Span
Units: person/Year
Enter Kindergarten=
SUM(Entrance[gender!])
Units: student/Year
Entrance[gender]= DELAY FIXED (
Becoming Children[gender], Duration
Pre School, Pre School[gender]/Duration Pre
School
Units: student/Year
fertility=
1.5/70
Units: person/(Year * person)
Fractional Death Rate=
1/70
Units: 1/Year
Graduation Elementary[gender]= DELAY FIXED (
Entrance [gender]* Fraction That
Continue STEM[gender], Duration Elementary,
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STEM Students Elementary[gender]* Fraction
That Continue STEM[gender]
/Duration Elementary)
Units: student/Year
Graduation HS[gender]= DELAY FIXED (
Graduation JH[gender]*Fraction That
Continue STEM[gender], Duration HS, STEM
Students HS
[gender]*Fraction That Continue STEM[gender]
/Duration HS)
Units: student/Year
Graduation JH[gender]= DELAY FIXED (
Graduation
Elementary[gender]* Fraction That Continue
STEM[gender], Duration JH
, STEM Students JH[gender]*Fraction That
Continue STEM[gender]
/Duration JH)
Units: student/Year
IV Population= INITIAL(
3e+008)
Units: person
Leave STEM College[gender]=
DELAY FIXED(Graduation
HS[gender]*College Fraction That Do Not
Continue STEM
[gender], Duration College, STEM Students
College[gender]*College Fraction That Do Not
Continue STEM
[gender]/Duration College)
Units: person/Year
Leave STEM Elementary[gender]= DELAY FIXED (
Entrance[gender]*Fraction That Do Not
Continue STEM[gender], Duration Elementary
,STEM Students Elementary[gender
]*Fraction That Do Not Continue
STEM[gender]/Duration Elementary)
Units: student/Year
Leave STEM HS[gender]= DELAY FIXED (
Graduation JH[gender]* Fraction That
Do Not Continue STEM[gender], Duration HS
, STEM Students HS[gender] *Fraction That Do
Not Continue STEM[gender]/Duration HS
Units: student/Year
Leave STEM JH[gender]= DELAY FIXED(
Graduation
Elementary[gender]* Fraction That Do Not
Continue STEM[gender],
Duration JH, STEM Students JH[gender]
*Fraction That Do Not Continue STEM[
gender]
/Duration JH)
Units: student/Year
Life Span=
70
Units: Year
Pipeline Following Elementary=
SUM(Graduation Elementary[gender!])
Units: student/Year
Pipeline Following HS=
SUM(Graduation HS[gender!])
Units: student/Year
Pipeline Following JH=
SUM(Graduation JH[gender!])
Units: student/Year
Population= INTEG (
birthing-dying,
IV Population)
Units: person
Pre School[gender]= INTEG (
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-Becoming
Children[gender]+Entrance[gender],
IV Pre School[gender])
Units: student
STEM College Graduation=
SUM(STEM College Outflow[gender!])
Units: student/Year
STEM College Outflow[gender]=
DELAY FIXED(Graduation
HS[gender]*College Fraction That Continue
STEM[gender
], Duration College, STEM Students
College[gender]*College Fraction That Continue
STEM
[gender]/Duration College )
Units: person/Year
STEM Students College[gender]= INTEG (
Graduation HS[gender]-Leave STEM
College[gender]-STEM College Outflow[gender
IV STEM Students
College[gender])
Units: person
STEM Students Elementary[gender]= INTEG (
Entrance[gender]-Graduation
Elementary[gender]-Leave STEM
Elementary[gender
],
IV STEM Students
Elementary[gender])
Units: student
STEM Students HS[gender]= INTEG (
-Graduation HS[gender]+Graduation
JH[gender]-Leave STEM HS[gender],
IV STEM Students HS[gender])
Units: student
STEM Students JH[gender]= INTEG (
Graduation Elementary[gender]-
Graduation JH[gender]-Leave STEM JH[gender],
IV STEM Students JH[gender])
Units: student
Switch for Birth Rate Type=
0
Units: 1 [0,1,1]
Variable Birth Rate=
fertility* Population
Units: person/Year
Adjustment Teacher Hires=
Qualified STEM Teacher
Shortfall/Time to close STEM teacher hiring gap
Units: teacher/Year
Desired Teacher Hires=
MAX( O0, Adjustment Teacher
Hires+Teachers Leaving)
Units: teacher/Year
Duration of Career=
40
Units: Year
Expected Relative STEM Teacher Wages=
IF THEN ELSE(Switch for quality
variation among STEM educated teachers,
LOOKUP INVERT
(Table for Effect of Teacher Wages on New
Teacher Quality, Average Quality of STEM
Educated Teachers
), 1)
Units: fraction
Must use switch here because a floating point
overflow error
occurs in the LOOKUP INVERT if
we don't guard it in this case.
Fractional Teacher Attrition Rate=
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IF THEN ELSE(Switch for Quality
Compensation Correlation :AND: Time >= Year
for Teacher Wage Policy Change
, 1.122,Teacher Attrition Rate Modifier From
Wage Expectation Changes
)/Normal Average STEM Teaching
Career Length
Units: 1/Year
IV STEM Workers= INITIAL(
(STEM grads wishing to engineer+STEM
teacher grads without teaching jobs)*
Duration of Career)
Units: person
New Engineers Entering Workforce=
STEM grads wishing to engineer+STEM
teacher grads without teaching jobs
Units: worker/Year
New STEM Teacher Hiring=
MIN(Desired Teacher Hires, STEM grads
wishing to teach)
Units: teacher/Year
Normal Average STEM Teaching Career Length=
10
Units: Year
Qualified STEM Teacher Shortfall=
STEM Teachers Needed-STEM Educated
Teachers
Units: person
STEM Educated Teachers= INTEG (
New STEM Teacher Hiring-Teacher
Attrition-Teacher Retirement,
IV STEM Teachers)
Units: teacher
STEM Retirement=
STEM Workers/Duration of Career
Units: worker/Year
STEM teacher grads without teaching jobs=
MAX(O, STEM grads wishing to teach-
Desired Teacher Hires)
Units: people/Year
STEM Teachers Needed=
(SUM(STEM Students
Elementary[gender!])+SUM(STEM Students
JH[gender!])+SUM
(STEM Students HS[gender!]))/Student Teacher
Ratio Goal
Units: person
STEM Workers= INTEG (
New Engineers Entering
Workforce+Teacher Attrition-STEM Retirement,
STEM Positions)
Units: worker
Student Teacher Ratio Goal=
50
Units: 1
Switch for Quality Compensation Correlation=
0
Units: 1 [0,1,1]
Switch for Teacher Attrition=
1
Units: 1 [0,1,1]
Can teachers quit and become STEM workers?
Teacher Attrition=
STEM Educated Teachers*Fractional
Teacher Attrition Rate*Switch for Teacher
Attrition
*Teacher Mobility
Units: teacher/Year
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Teacher Attrition Rate Modifier From Wage
Expectation Changes=
IF THEN ELSE(Switch for quality
variation among STEM educated
teachers,Expected Relative STEM Teacher
Wages
/Relative STEM Teacher Wages, 1)
Units: Dimensionless
Must use switch here so that attrition rates are
not modified
based on quality variation when
we don't intend quality
variation to have any impact.
Teacher Retirement=
STEM Educated Teachers/Duration of
Career
Units: teacher/Year
Teachers Leaving=
Teacher Attrition+Teacher Retirement
Units: teacher/Year
Time to close STEM teacher hiring gap=
1
Units: Year
Effect of Labor Gap on Pay=
IF THEN ELSE(Pay Curve
Switch,Table for effect of Labor Gap on
Pay(Relative STEM Labor Gap
), Table for effect of Labor Gap on Pay
2(Relative STEM Labor Gap))
Units: 1
Effect of STEM Wages on Number of Positions=
IF THEN ELSE(Job Curve Switch, Table
for effect of STEM Wages on Number of
Positions
(Relative STEM wages), Table for effect of STEM
Wages on Number of Positions 2
(Relative STEM wages))
Units: 1
Indicated STEM Positions=
Effect of STEM Wages on Number of
Positions*Societal Demand for STEM Work
Units: job
Indicated STEM Wages=
Effect of Labor Gap on Pay*STEM
Wages
Units: dollar/worker
IV STEM Positions Constant=
7.207e+006
Units: job
IV STEM Wages=
LOOKUP INVERT(Table for effect of
wages on retention, Normal Initial Fraction That
Continue STEM
Units: dollar/person
IV STEM Wages Constant=
0.9297
Units: dollar/worker [0.8,1.2,0.001]
This parameter is tuned by hand to set initial
wages of STEM
workers to start the system in
equilibrium.
job creation=
MAX(0, STEM Position Gap/Job Creation
Smoothing Time)
Units: job/Year
Job Creation Smoothing Time=
1
Units: Year
Job Curve Switch=
0
Units: Dimensionless [0,1,1]
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Which curve to use?
job destruction=
MAX(0, -STEM Position Gap/Job
Destruction Smoothing Time)
Units: job/Year
Job Destruction Smoothing Time=
Units: Year
Other wages=
1
Units: dollar/worker
Pay Curve Switch=
0
Units: Dimensionless [0,1,1]
Which curve to use?
Population Fraction of STEM Positions=
Population Fraction of STEM Positions
With RAMP
Units: job/person
Population Fraction of STEM Positions With
RAMP=
0.02+RAMP(STEM Position Growth/90,
1950, 2040 )+(Switch for business cycle
oscillation
*0.002*Ilnput)
Units: job/person
Population Fraction of STEM Positions With
STEP=
0.02+STEP(0.2, 1990)
Units: job/person
Population Fraction of STEM Postions FLAT=
0.02
Units: job/person
Relative STEM Labor Gap=
XIDZ(STEM Positions,STEM
Workers,le+012)
Units: job/worker
Relative STEM wages=
STEM Wages/Other wages
Units: 1
Societal Demand for STEM Work=
Population*Population Fraction of
STEM Positions
Units: job
STEM Position Gap=
Indicated STEM Positions-STEM
Positions
Units: job
STEM Position Growth=
0.02
Units: Dimensionless [0,0.2,0.01]
Does the amount of demand for STEM workers
increase over time.
If so, by how much?
STEM Positions= INTEG (
job creation-job destruction,
IV STEM Positions Constant)
Units: job
STEM Wages= INTEG (
wage increase-wage decrease,
IV STEM Wages Constant)
Units: dollar/worker
Switch for business cycle oscillation=
0
Units: Dimensionless [0,1,1]
Table for effect of Labor Gap on Pay(
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[(0,0)-(10, 100)],(-
0.00611621,0.0701754),(0.00611621,0.149123)
,(0.183486,0.219298
),(0.348624,0.236842),(0.550459,0.438596),(0.7
52294,0.587719),(0.88685,0.833333
),(1,1),(1.14985,1.17544),(1.37615,1.49123),(1.7
37,1.86842),(2.31193,2.68421
),(2.86239,3.75439),(3.3578,5.04386),(3.85321,
6.71053),(4.6789,9.25439),(6.02446
,13.8596),(7.30887,18.7719),(8.65443,25.9211),
(9.05199,30),(9.66361,40.3509
),(9.93884,53.5088))
Units: 1
Table for effect of Labor Gap on Pay 2(
[(0,0)-(100,100)],(-
0.0030581,0.236842),(0.103976,0.27193),(0.26
2997,0.333333
),(0.431193,0.403509),(0.593272,0.517544),(0.7
37003,0.662281),(0.88685,0.833333
),(1,1),(1.14985,1.29825),(1.23547,1.50877),(1.3
8226,1.82456),(1.65138,2.52632
),(2.22018,4.12281),(2.75229,5.5),(3.34862,6.80
702),(3.79205,7.89474),(4.8685
,11),(5.96942,14.8333),(7.30887,18.7719),(8.65
443,25.9211),(9.05199,30),(9.66361
,40.3509),(9.93884,53.5088))
Units: 1
Table for effect of STEM Wages on Number of
Positions(
[(0,0)-
(10,10)],(0.030581,10),(0.33945,2.86842),(0.422
018,2.40789),(0.477064
,2.15789),(0.550459,1.86842),(0.623853,1.6842
1),(0.706422,1.48684),(0.788991
,1.34211),(0.862385,1.21053),(0.926606,1.0921
1),(1,1),(1.07339,0.947368),(1.17431
,0.868421),(1.3211,0.815789),(1.54128,0.75),(1.
80734,0.684211),(2.00917,0.671053
),(2.13761,0.631579),(2.33945,0.605263),(2.577
98,0.552632),(2.6055,0.552632
),(2.77064,0.539474),(2.88073,0.526316),(2.935
78,0.526316),(3,0.5),(4,0.35)
,(5,0.2),(6,0.1))
Units: 1
Table for effect of STEM Wages on Number of
Positions 2(
[(0,0)-
(10,10)],(0.030581,10),(0.33945,2.86842),(0.422
018,2.59211),(0.486239
,2.35526),(0.550459,2.17105),(0.636086,1.8947
4),(0.703364,1.71053),(0.801223
,1.5),(0.862385,1.33333),(0.929664,1.19298),(1,
1),(1.08257,0.842105),(1.19266
,0.736842),(1.33333,0.596491),(1.52905,0.4824
56),(1.80428,0.368421),(2.01835
,0.315789),(2.14679,0.315789),(2.34862,0.2894
74),(2.53211,0.25),(2.6422,0.236842
),(2.76147,0.223684),(2.87156,0.210526),(2.981
65,0.210526),(3.19266,0.197368
),(3.96024,0.184211),(5.00917,0.131579),(6,0.1)
Units: 1
wage decrease=
MAX(0, -1 * (Indicated STEM Wages-
STEM Wages)/Wage Decrease Smoothing Time
Units: dollars/person/Year
Wage Decrease Smoothing Time=
1
Units: Year
wage increase=
MAX(0, (Indicated STEM Wages-STEM
Wages)/Wage Increase Smoothing Time)
Units: dollar/worker/Year
Wage Increase Smoothing Time=
1
Units: Year
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Fraction That Are Able To Continue STEM=
Table for effect of teacher
quality on retention(Average STEM Teacher
Quality
Units: 1
Fraction That Continue STEM[gender]=
(Fraction That Are Able To Continue
STEM*Fraction That Wish to Continue STEM
)+Gender Related Continuation
Modifier[gender]
Units: fraction
Fraction That Do Not Continue STEM[gender]=
1-Fraction That Continue STEM[gender]
Units: 1
Fraction That Wish to Continue STEM=
Table for effect of wages on
retention(Relative STEM wages)
Units: 1
Gender Related Continuation Modifier[gender]=
0.1,0.1
Units: Dimensionless
Initial Fraction That Continue STEM[gender]=
Normal Initial Fraction That Continue
STEM+Gender Related Continuation Modifier
[gender]
Units: fraction [0,1,0.01]
Normal Initial Fraction That Continue STEM=
0.3519
Units: fraction [0,1,0.0001]
This parameter is tuned by hand to make the
system start in
equilibrium. It controls the
number of students in all stages of
the education pipeline.
Table for effect of teacher quality on retention(
[(-0.04,0)-(1000,1000)],(-
0.030581,0.0394737),(0.122202,0.245614),(0.2
53211
,0.407895),(0.402936,0.578947),(0.576514,0.72
807),(0.718654,0.815789),(0.932722
,0.868421),(1.23853,0.912281),(993.884,100))
Units: Dimensionless
Table for effect of teacher quality on retention
Orig(
[(-0.04,0)-(2,1)],(-
0.030581,0.1),(0.114128,0.307018),(0.252844,0
.482456),
(0.422385,0.622807),(0.576514,0.72807),(0.718
654,0.815789),(0.932722,0.868421
),(1.23853,0.912281),(993.884,5))
Units: Dimensionless
Table for effect of wages on retention(
[(0,0)-
(10,1)],(0,0.025),(0.220183,0.0570175),(0.45259
9,0.118421),(0.678899
,0.20614),(0.874618,0.346491),(1,0.5),(1.15596,
0.605263),(1.3945,0.714912),
(1.66972,0.798246),(1.87768,0.859649),(2.0244
6,0.881579),(100,1))
Units: 1
Attractiveness of STEM industry job[male]=
Table for Effect of Wages On
Attractiveness(STEM Wages/Other wages)
Attractiveness of STEM industry job[female]=
Table for Effect of Wages On
Attractiveness(STEM Comparison
Wages/Average Comparison Wages
Units: DmnI
Attractiveness of STEM teaching job[male]=
Table for Effect of Wages On
Attractiveness(Teacher wages/Other wages)
Attractiveness of STEM teaching job[female]=
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Table for Effect of Wages On
Attractiveness(Teacher wages/Average
Comparison Wages
Units: Dmnl
Fraction of STEM grads choosing
teaching[gender]=
Attractiveness of STEM teaching
job[gender]/Total STEM career attractiveness
[gender]
Units: Dmnl
STEM grads wishing to engineer=
SUM(STEM grads wishing to engineer
by gender[gender!])
Units: people/Year
STEM grads wishing to engineer by
gender[gender]=
(1-Fraction of STEM grads choosing
teaching[gender])*STEM College Outflow[
male]
Units: people/Year
STEM grads wishing to teach=
SUM(STEM grads wishing to teach by
gender[gender!])
Units: people/Year
STEM grads wishing to teach by
gender[gender]=
Fraction of STEM grads choosing
teaching[gender] *STEM College
Outflow[gender
]
Units: people/Year
Table for Effect of Wages On Attractiveness(
[(0,0)-
(1.2,1)],(0,0),(0.165138,0.0131579),(0.281346,0.
0263158),(0.397554,
0.0438596),(0.458716,0.0482456),(0.517431,0.
0614035),(0.568807,0.0745614),(
0.631193,0.0833333),(0.678899,0.0877193),(0.
755963,0.110526),(0.829358,0.150439
),(0.895413,0.193421),(0.954128,0.254386),(0.9
96942,0.289474),(1.04587,0.333333
),(1.11315,0.394737),(1.14985,0.451754),(1.198
78,0.526316),(1.25994,0.587719
),(1.30275,0.649123),(1.33333,0.710526),(1.388
38,0.754386),(1.43119,0.789474
),(1.47401,0.833333),(1.51682,0.877193),(1.565
75,0.921053),(1.61468,0.95614
),(1.65138,0.964912),(1.69419,0.973684),(1.749
24,0.969298),(1.82263,0.986842
),(9.93884,1.97368))
Units: Dmnl
Table for Effect of Wages On Attractiveness
Orig(
[(0,0)-
(2,2)],(0,0),(0.165138,0.0131579),(0.281346,0.0
263158),(0.397554,0.0438596
),(0.489297,0.0789474),(0.556575,0.0964912),(
0.574924,0.0964912),(0.666667,
0.114035),(0.75841,0.140351),(0.83792,0.1754
39),(0.899083,0.22807),(0.954128
,0.254386),(0.996942,0.289474),(1.04587,0.333
333),(1.11315,0.394737),(1.14985
,0.451754),(1.19878,0.526316),(1.25994,0.5877
19),(1.30275,0.649123),(1.33333
,0.710526),(1.38838,0.754386),(1.43119,0.7894
74),(1.47401,0.833333),(1.51682
,0.877193),(1.56575,0.921053),(1.61468,0.9561
4),(1.65138,0.964912),(1.69419
,0.973684),(1.74924,0.969298),(1.82263,0.9868
42),(9.93884,1.97368))
Units: Dmnl
Total STEM career attractiveness[gender]=
Attractiveness of STEM industry
job[gender]+Attractiveness of STEM teaching
job
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[gender]
Units: Dmnl
IV Pre School[gender]= INITIAL(
birthing*Duration Pre School/2)
Units: student
IV STEM Positions= INITIAL(
IV Population* Population Fraction of
STEM Positions)
Units: person
IV STEM Students College[gender]= INITIAL(
IV STEM Students HS[gender]/Duration
HS*Duration College*Fraction That Continue
STEM
[gender])
Units: student
IV STEM Students Elementary[gender]= INITIAL(
(IV Pre School[gender]/Duration Pre
School)*Duration Elementary)
Units: student
IV STEM Students HS[gender]=
(IV STEM Students JH[gender]/Duration
JH)*Duration HS*Initial Fraction That Continue
STEM
[gender]
Units: student
IV STEM Students JH[gender]= INITIAL(
(IV STEM Students
Elementary[gender]/Duration
Elementary)*Duration JH*Initial Fraction That
Continue STEM
[gender])
Units: student
IV STEM Teachers= INITIAL(
STEM Teachers Needed)
Units: teacher
Average Comparison Wages=
Historical Womens
Wages+(Teacher Mobility*(Other wages-
Historical Womens Wages
))
Units: dollars/person
Competitive Teacher Wage Ratio=
1
Units: Dimensionless [0.1,3,0.1]
If teachers are paid wages proportional to STEM
workers, what
percentage of STEM worker pay
are they receiving? If this number
is set to 1, then they are paid
equally.
Fixed Teacher Wage Adjustment Amount=
0
Units: dollars/teacher [0,3,0.1]
If teachers are given a fixed wage increase,
what is the new
wage level?
Historical Teacher Wages= INITIAL(
0.6)
Units: dollar/teacher
Historical Womens Wages=
0.4
Units: dollar/person
Intrinsic teacher rewards[gender]=
0.1
Units: dollars/teacher
Mobility Adjustment Time=
10
Units: Year [1,50,1]
If women are allowed to enter the workforce,
how long does this
transition take?
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Mobility Start Year=
1975
Units: Year [1940,2400,1]
If women are allowed to enter the workforce,
what year does this
transition start?
Policy Directed Teacher Wage Goal=
(STEM Comparison Wages*Time
Dependent Competitive Teacher Wage
Ratio)+Time Switch for Fixed Teacher Wage
Adjustment
Units: dollar/teacher
Relative STEM Teacher Wages=
ZIDZ(Teacher wages,STEM Comparison
Wages)
Units: fraction
STEM Comparison Wages=
Historical Womens Wages+(Teacher
Mobility*(STEM Wages-Historical Womens
Wages
Units: dollars/teacher
Switch for Competitive Teacher Wages=
0
Units: Dimensionless [0,1,1]
After the current year, are teachers paid wages
that are tied to
the amount paid to STEM
workers?
Switch for Fixed Teacher Wage Adjustment=
0
Units: Dimensionless [0,1,1]
After the current year are STEM teachers given
a fixed wage
going forward that is higher
than before?
Switch for Women in Workforce=
0
Units: 1 [0,1,1]
Are women allowed to enter the workforce?
Teacher Mobility=
RAMP(1/Mobility Adjustment Time,
Mobility Start Year, Mobility Start Year
+ Mobility Adjustment Time )*Switch for
Women in Workforce
Units: 1
Teacher wages=
IF THEN ELSE(Time >= Year for Teacher
Wage Policy Change, MAX(Policy Directed
Teacher Wage Goal
Historical Teacher Wages
), Historical Teacher Wages )+Intrinsic
teacher rewards[female]
Units: dollar/teacher
Time Dependent Competitive Teacher Wage
Ratio=
Competitive Teacher Wage Ratio*Time
Switch for Competitive Teacher Wages
Units: Dimensionless
Time Switch for Competitive Teacher Wages=
IF THEN ELSE(Time >= Year for Teacher
Wage Policy Change, Switch for Competitive
Teacher Wages
,0)
Units: 1
Time Switch for Fixed Teacher Wage
Adjustment=
IF THEN ELSE(Time >= Year for Teacher
Wage Policy Change, Switch for Fixed Teacher
Wage Adjustment
*Fixed Teacher Wage Adjustment Amount, 0)
Units: dollar/teacher
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Year for Teacher Wage Policy Change=
2008
Units: Year [1940,2400,1]
In what year does a new wage policy begin?
(2008 by default)
Average Quality of New STEM Educated
Teachers=
IF THEN ELSE(Switch for quality
variation among STEM educated teachers, Table
for Effect of Teacher Wages on New Teacher
Quality
(Relative STEM Teacher Wages),
IV Average Quality of STEM Educated Teachers
Units: quality/teacher
Average Quality of STEM Educated Teachers=
ZIDZ(Total Effective STEM Educated
Teacher Quality,STEM Educated Teachers)
Units: quality/teacher
Average STEM Teacher Quality=
IF THEN ELSE(Switch for impact of STEM
educated teacher shortage, (Average Quality of
STEM Educated Teachers
*Percentage Classrooms Taught By STEM
Educated Teachers)+(Quality of Unqualified
Teachers
*(1-Percentage Classrooms Taught By STEM
Educated Teachers)), Average Quality of STEM
Educated Teachers
Units: quality/teacher
Increase in Quality from Hiring=
Average Quality of New STEM Educated
Teachers*New STEM Teacher Hiring
Units: quality/Year
IV Average Quality of STEM Educated Teachers=
INITIAL(
Table for Effect of Teacher Wages on
New Teacher Quality
(Relative STEM Teacher Wages))
Units: quality/teacher
IV Total Effective STEM Educated Teacher
Quality=
IV Average Quality of STEM Educated
Teachers*IV STEM Teachers
Units: quality
Loss of Quality from Attrition=
Average Quality of STEM Educated
Teachers*Teachers Leaving
Units: quality/Year
Percentage Classrooms Taught By STEM
Educated Teachers=
STEM Educated Teachers/STEM
Teachers Needed
Units: fraction
Quality of Unqualified Teachers=
0.1
Units: quality/teacher [0,1,0.01]
What is the quality level of teachers who are
teaching STEM
subjects, but are not trained in
STEM?
Switch for impact of STEM educated teacher
shortage=
1
Units: Dimensionless [0,1,1]
Does a shortage in the number of qualified
STEM teachers impact
teacher quality?
Switch for quality variation among STEM
educated teachers=
1
Units: Dimensionless [0,1,1]
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Does quality variation among teacherw who
have STEM credentials
occur?
Table for Effect of Teacher Wages on New
Teacher Quality(
[(0,0)-
(3,1)],(0.00917431,0.236842),(0.155963,0.2543
86),(0.302752,0.276316
),(0.422018,0.315789),(0.550459,0.355263),(0.6
69725,0.403509),(0.779817,0.460526
),(0.889908,0.530702),(1,0.592105),(1.10092,0.
653509),(1.22018,0.723684),(1.34862
,0.776316),(1.50459,0.850877),(1.61468,0.8771
93),(1.6789,0.885965),(1.77982
,0.912281),(1.93578,0.938596),(2.13761,0.9473
68),(2.33945,0.960526),(2.57798
,0.973684),(2.79817,0.986842),(2.98165,1))
Units: quality/teacher
Table for Effect of Teacher Wages on New
Teacher Quality Orig(
[(0,0)-
(3,1)],(0.00917431,0.00877193),(0.211009,0.03
94737),(0.348624,0.0614035
),(0.477064,0.105263),(0.587156,0.157895),(0.7
15596,0.22807),(0.798165,0.315789
),(0.899083,0.403509),(1,0.5),(1.11009,0.59210
5),(1.22936,0.684211),(1.34862
,0.776316),(1.50459,0.850877),(1.61468,0.8771
93),(1.6789,0.885965),(1.77982
,0.912281),(1.93578,0.938596),(2.13761,0.9473
68),(2.33945,0.960526),(2.57798
,0.973684),(2.79817,0.986842),(2.98165,1))
Units: quality/teacher
Total Effective STEM Educated Teacher Quality=
INTEG (
Increase in Quality from Hiring-Loss of
Quality from Attrition,
IV Total Effective STEM
Educated Teacher Quality)
Units: quality
Unqualified STEM Teachers=
MAX(0, Qualified STEM Teacher
Shortfall)
Units: teacher
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